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The research presented in this PhD
 thesis is conducted on the basis of a dou-
ble degree contract betw
een Ghent University and the University of Gronin-
gen. At Ghent University, this research w






”. All of the survey experim
ents are funded 
by the Research Foundation Flanders (FW
O) – project nr. G.0683.13N
. As part 
of this project, a paper w




in 2014 in Frontiers in Psychology titled “H
ow
 (not) to argue about is/ought in-
ferences in the cognitive sciences”. This paper can be found in Appendix A.  
PREFACE
If I had to identify a central them




 thesis then it w
ould be one about crossing borders and changing places. 
In a literal sense, all the w
ork that I have done to com
plete this PhD





ith advisors or co-au-
thors, attending w
orkshops, subm
itting papers to journals, and so forth) w
as 






 York, Graz, 
Bochum
, and num
erous other places. Parts of this thesis w
ere even w
ritten 
in Kralendijk (Bonaire) and behind the steering w
heel of a truck (of course, 
w
hile parked in a loading dock!). D
uring this tim






There is also a m
etaphorical sense in w
hich this thesis crossed borders. 
The research that is part of this thesis is interdisciplinary in nature. I inves-
tigated an em
pirical claim
 that plays a role in philosophical theories and I 
em
ployed research m
ethodologies typically used by social scientists. In the 
process, I tried to translate philosophical assum
ptions into em
pirical hypoth-
eses and I assessed the philosophical significance of em
pirical findings. In 
order to get this w
ork done properly, I studied philosophical literature in m
e-
taethics, psychological and sociological theories on m
oral values and behav-
ior, and I consulted literature on statistical m
ethodology to appropriately run 
the necessary statistical analyses. M
oreover, I consulted w
ith philosophers, 
sociologists, psychologists, statisticians and m
any others from
 a range of dif-
ferent disciplines.
 
This thesis could not have been com
pleted, how




illing to share their know






ic papers or how
 to run statistical analyses correctly, or 
w
ho helped m
e organize and coordinate everything necessary for m
y stays 
abroad or for the double degree contract betw
een Groningen and Ghent. 
O
ne of the people w
ho deserve a special m











ith the opportunity to be a visiting assistant in research and he generous-
ly spent tim
e to help m
e w
ork out survey experim
ents, getting to know
 others 




ic papers.  
I am
 also very grateful for the support of m
y prom
otors and advisors, Jan 
Verplaetse and Katinka Q
uintelier in Ghent, Frank H
indriks, D
aan Evers, and 
Bart Streum
er in Groningen. They m
ade it possible for m
e to w
ork in both 
places and they advised m
e on all aspects of this PhD
 thesis. This thesis has 
im





dations, and by the discussions that w
e had about m
etaethics, experim
en-
tal philosophy, and the relationship betw
een both. I w
ould also like to thank 
Thom
as Pölzler and Jacob D
ijkstra. It really w




 on developing research on m
oral progress, know
ledge and error 





ith regard to all the coordination and organization of this project, I am
 




as a lot of w
ork involved in arranging the different stays abroad, run-
ning experim
ents and arranging funding, and m
aking it possible for this pro-
ject to take place in Groningen, Ghent, and N
ew
 H
aven. Katelijne and M
arga 
put a lot of tim
e and effort in arranging these things and alw
ays did so in good 
spirit. I am





 research I also received a lot of support from
 m
y par-
ents and I am
 obviously very grateful for that. The support that they provid-
ed m
ade m







pleasurable. I also have pleasant m
em
ories of their visits to each of the places 
that I spent a longer am
ount of tim





In the past years I have not only developed m
yself in an academ
ic sense 
but it w
as also very m
uch a personal journey. I am
 grateful for the friendship 
and support of D
ebora W
eerm




ick Stagnaro, and Ryan M
ays. To Joringel, I w
ould like to express m
y grati-
tude for his friendship (and all the extrem
ely pleasant and fun m
om
ents in 
the past years) and for the fact that he has alw
ays been a true believer in w
hat 
I am
 capable of doing (at least from
 his perspective!). I share m
any interests 
w
ith Joringel, especially those that m





, art, and com
edy, and Joringel is 
the one w
ho noted the relevance of the song Spread your W
ings by Q
ueen in 
relation to this thesis (see quote above). I am
 grateful to D
ebora for her joyous 
spirit and her patience and care in the past years and for the pleasant m
em
-
ories in Groningen, Ghent, N
ew
 H
aven, Bonaire, and m
any other places. To 
Kari, I w
ould like to express m





 research, for the elaborate conversations that w
e had about the m
any 
m
eaningful and joyful things in life, and for her lasting friendship. I am
 ex-
trem









azed by her exceptional abilities 
to put into w
ords those things that are very diffi
cult to perceive and/or to ex-
press verbally. I am
 also grateful to N














e experienced in N
ew
 H
aven and in Rotterdam
/Am
sterdam
 during their vis-
its. Finally, I am
 grateful for the support of fellow
 PhD
 students in Groningen, 
Ghent, and Yale. I w
ould especially like to thank Stipe Pandžić for being one 
of m
y paranym
phs and for his friendship in the past years.
 
This journey has com
e to an end but I look forw





here I can build on the w













ative ethics, applied ethics, and m
etaethics. Theories in 
norm
ative ethics focus on first-order questions about w
hat actions are m
or-
ally right or w
rong and good or bad. Theories in applied ethics concern the 
practical application of ethical theories to real-life circum
stances and sce-
narios. Theories in m
etaethics, on the other hand, aim




entally is. For instance, they concern the content of m
oral 
concepts, the relationship betw
een m
oral reasons and being m
otivated to act 
m
orally, w
hether there are m
oral properties and w
hat kind of entity they are, 
and w
hether or not m
oral objectivism
 is true. 
 
This PhD





etaethicists is true, nam






 is an em
pirical thesis about the nature of or-
dinary m
oral discourse and thought. According to this thesis, people believe 
that m




 is true. M
ore specifically, the thesis describes people as believing that 
m
oral sentences are true or false independently of any individual’s subjective 
attitudes and any particular cultural perspective. The argum
ents that philos-
ophers provide for FM
O
 often com
e in the form
 of descriptions of ordinary 
m
oral discourse and appeals to intuitions. D
espite the fact that this is an em
-
pirical claim
 that can be tested, philosophers rarely use em
pirical m
ethodol-





The question of w
hether or not FM
O
 is true is im
portant for theories in 
m




 in their m
e-
taethical theories. Second, som
e philosophers claim











etaethical theories less plausible (i.e. m
oral antirealism
).  
In recent years, psychologists and experim








arley 2008, 2010, 
2012; Pölzler &
 W







hite 2011).  In extant studies, people treat m
any 
m
oral sentences as if those sentences are subjectively true or false or neither 
true nor false. M
oreover, as I discuss extensively below, there are no partic-
ipants in those studies w
ho consistently treat m
oral sentences as objectively 








 in their theories, these findings are 
rem
arkable and in need of explanation.
 
The m
ain research question of this PhD








O. In this PhD
 m
anuscript you w
ill find an investigation into 
both questions and tentative answ
ers.
 
In Chapter 1, I review
 existing research on folk m
etaethics and I evaluate 
w
hether or not they provide evidence for or against FM
O. M
y investigation 
reveals that it is not clear w
hether they provide genuine evidence. The first 
reason for this is that m
any m
easures do not directly or not exclusively m
eas-
ure w
hat is relevant for FM
O. The second reason is that there is a distinction 
betw
een im




ents. For instance, peo-
ple m
ay explicitly believe, and verbally express, that m
orality is relative. At 
the sam
e tim
e, it is possible that they im
plicitly believe, and act accordingly, 
as if there are objective m
oral facts. Consequently, im














ents and that it is not clear w





easured by existing research on folk m
etaethics.
 
In Chapter 2 I present research in w
hich I investigate w
hether an exist-
ing psychological construct, w
hich is used in em
pirical research as an indi-







 or also related m
etaethical view
s. M
ore specifically, I investigated 
w
hether people’s intuitions about m
oral truth are best m




 (i.e. perceived objectivity) versus non-objec-
tivism
 or w





people’s intuitions. If there are different dim
ensions, is this related to peo-
ple’s scores on tolerance m
easures? For instance, although philosophically 
distinct view
s, it is psychologically possible that people’s intuitions about the 
objectivity of m
oral judgm





 and opposed to relativism
. If so, it m
ay be true that higher scores on ob-
jectivism
/absolutism
 decrease people’s tolerance tow
ard others and that low
-
er scores (i.e., having intuitions about relativism
) increase people’s tolerance. 
H
ow





ensions and that intuitions about relativism
 
oppose the form
er and not the latter, or vice versa. If so, this also raises new
 
questions about the relationship w
ith tolerance.
 
Existing research has show
n that there are large differences in people’s 
judgm








y results strongly sug-
gest that people’s intuitions about m
oral truth are indeed m
ultidim
ensional 
and that each dim
ension, w
hich I have term
ed Independent Truth, Universal 
Truth, and D
ivine Truth, have different relationships w











used in existing research m
easure im




















e philosophers suggest is the case. 






ents. If this is true, the large differences that w
e observe in 
people’s judgm




be relevant for our assessm
ent of FM
O. Fortunately, Enoch (2014) has devel-
oped three tests, w
hich he uses as intuition pum
ps, w
hich in his view
 should 
show





 even if they 
explicitly deny this. I use those tests as m
aterial for a survey experim
ent to test 
w
hether people indeed respond in a w
ay that Enoch expects. The results show
 
that for each of the thought experim
ents separately, the m
ajority of people do 
respond as if FM
O
 is true. H
ow
ever, w
hen people’s responses are com
bined, 
this becom
es less clear. N
evertheless, this research provides som
e support for 












ents, I explore 




 (in collaboration w
ith Thom
-
as Pölzler and Jacob D
ijkstra). Previous research investigated w
hether or not 
people believe that m
oral judgm
ents are objectively true or false and w
hether 
or not they believe that at m





 is true, how
ever, people w
ill also believe in the possibility 
of m
oral progress, know
ledge, and error (or so w
e argue). W
e therefore de-
signed a survey experim
ent to investigate w
hether this is indeed the case. O
ur 
participants responded, both abstractly and for concrete cases, to questions 
about m
oral progress, know
ledge, and error, in the dom
ains of m
orality, sci-




ed that people believe that scientific statem
ents are objective-
ly true or false. W
e also assum
ed that people do not believe that statem
ents 




hen people are asked abstractly, and also w
hen asked 
to judge concrete cases, they provide responses that suggest that they believe 
scientific statem
ents are objectively true or false. W
ith regard to m
orality, 
how
ever, people’s responses are, overall, m
ore com
parable to their respons-
es to personal preferences or conventions. Consequently, the results of this 





y research reveals that w
e should be careful in interpreting em
-
pirical results as evidence against FM
O. First, previous studies that claim
 to 
provide support for folk m
oral objectivism





O. Second, the studies in this thesis do not provide univocal 
evidence for it. Third, an ultim
ate verdict requires a thorough investigation of 
the distinction betw
een im
plicit and explicit com
m
itm
ents. This thesis takes 







5 univocal support for FM
O. Thus, in spite of initial optim
ism
, I conclude that 
the jury is still out. If FM
O
 is indeed true, this is not im
m
ediately obvious if 
w










CHAPTER 1  DO
ES EM

















ong philosophers is that people are m
oral objec-
tivists, w




psychological research appears to shed doubt on FM
O. For instance, even 
though people seem
 to treat som
e m
oral statem
ents as objectively true or 
false, they treat other m
oral statem
ents as subjectively true or false, or even 
as neither true nor false. M
oreover, there seem
 to be large differences be-
tw
een different individuals w
ith regard to the objectivity that they attribute 
to m
orality. In this paper I investigate w
hether the findings of psychological 
research provide evidence that show
s that FM
O
 is true or false. M
y analysis 
reveals, firstly, that m
any of the em
pirical m
easures that are used in psycho-
logical research do not directly pertain to FM
O. Secondly, those m
easures 
that seem
 to pertain to FM
O
 m
ay elicit explicit com
m
itm










I conclude that the thesis of folk m
oral objectivism









e philosophers believe that there are objectively true m
oral judgm
ents 
(Brink 1984; Gibbard 1992; Railton 1996; Sm
ith 1994; Sturgeon 1985) and oth-
ers do not (Ayer 1936; H





espite the differences am
ong philosophers about w
hether or not 
m
oral objectivism
 is true, m
ost of them
 share the assum
ption that lay peo-
ple believe in m
oral objectivism





ost philosophers believe that this 
is som
ething that m
etaethical theories should accom
m
odate. In this paper, 
I w
ill refer to the assum











ental philosophers have recently started to 
em
pirically investigate folk m
etaethics and the results of those studies appear 
to m
ake it less likely that FM
O




ore objectively than judgm
ents about m
atters of taste or social 
conventions (Goodw
in and D
arley 2008), they do not treat m
oral statem
ents 
as objectively as factual statem
ents, w
hich are ordinarily considered as be-
longing to a dom








ore strikingly, there are large 
differences betw
een different people in the objectivity they attribute to m
oral 
issues; and people treat certain m


















cient reason not to take these studies at face value. 
First, m
any m
easures that are used do not directly m
easure folk m
oral ob-
jectivity. Second, there is a difference betw






 (Zijlstra, unpublished). And it m
ay be that 
only the latter type of com
m
itm




 that this is the case, I w
ill discuss som
e of the key findings of psy-
chological research on folk m
etaethics and argue w
hy they neither support 
nor underm
ine FM
O. The paper is organized as follow
s. In section 1, I discuss 
9
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W
hat is crucial is that these philosophers suggest that people think that m
oral 
sentences are true or false independently of w
hatever subjective responses 
they have. I w
ill term
 this criterion ‘Independence’. M
oreover, people are 
described as believing that those w





ore specifically, that only one party to a m
oral disagreem
ent can be 
correct (Jackson 2000, Sm
ith 1994, Streum
er 2018). I w




ption that is usually left im
plicit is that, if one m
oral belief is 
objectively true or false, then other m
oral beliefs are also objectively true or 
false. Parfit questions this assum
ption:
W
e should not assum
e that the objectivity of Ethics m
ust be 
all-or-nothing. There m
ay be a part of m
orality that is objective. In 
describing this part, our claim
s m
ay be true. W
hen w
e consider this part 
of m
orality, or these m
oral questions, w
e m





ay be other questions about 
w
hich w
e shall never agree. There m
ay be no true answ
ers to these ques-
tions. Since objectivity need not be all-or-nothing, m
oral sceptics m
ay be 
partly right. These questions m
ay be subjective. (Parfit, 1984, p. 452)
Consequently, Parfit believes that the thesis of m
oral objectivism
 does not 
necessarily im
ply that all m
oral claim
s are objectively true or false. Instead, it 
is possible that som
e m
oral statem
ents are objectively true or false and others 
are subjectively true or false. It is possible that the sam




ents of the folk. People m




objectively true or false and others are not. Som
e philosophers and psycholo-
gists, how
ever, believe that w
hat w
e m
ight call ‘the uniform
ity assum
ption’ 










n this interpretation, a violation of the 
uniform
ity assum











hy philosophers believe that the FM
O
 assum
ption is true. O
n the basis of 
these reasons, I develop three criteria of folk m
oral objectivity. In section 2, 
I discuss psychological research and I em
ploy the three criteria in order to 
assess w
hether or not this research provides evidence in favour of FM
O. I 






plicitly and explicitly, and that ex-














e that people are m
oral objectivists and that this is 
som
ething m
etaethical theories should accom
m
odate (Brink, 1989; Cuneo, 
2007; Finlay, 2007; N
ichols, 2004). For exam
ple, Brink (1984) w
rites that “[I]n 
m
oral deliberation and argum
ent w







e to be independent of our m
eans of 
arriving at them




s as assertions that can be objectively true or false, 
that they believe that som
e people are better at grasping objective m
oral facts 
than others, and that they believe that objective m
oral progress is possible. In 
the rare case that people do respond as antirealists, this is due to a cognitive 
process that led them
 to believe that the realists’ com
m
itm
ents are untenable 









e (that is, 




 to think m
oral questions have correct answ
ers; that the correct 
answ
ers are m
ade correct by objective m
oral facts; that m








e can discover w
hat these objective m
oral facts 
determ
ined by the circum
stances are. (Sm
ith, 1994, p. 6)
11
12
CHAPTER 1  DO
ES EM













?  CHAPTER 1
FM
O. In the next section I w
ill argue that despite a w
ealth of interesting re-




e cannot yet interpret those re-
sults as providing clear evidence for or against FM
O. 
2.1. The very beginning of em
pirical research on folk m
etaethics
An early psychological study into the question of w
hether people are m
oral 
objectivists has been conducted by N
ichols (2004).  N
ichols explored people’s 
view
s of different kinds of disagreem
ents (m
oral, conventional, factual). In the 
m
oral disagreem




John and Fred are m
em
bers of different cultures, and they are in an ar-
gum
ent. John says “It’s okay to hit people just because you feel like it,” 
and Fred says “N
o, it is not okay to hit people just because you feel like 
it.” John then says “Look you are w
rong. Everyone I know
 agrees that it’s 
okay to do that.” Fred responds, “O




 agrees that it’s not okay to do that. (N
ichols, 2004, p. 9)
Subsequently, participants w
ere asked w
hich of the follow
ing answ
er options 
best characterized their view
s:
- It is okay to hit people just because you feel like it, so John is right and 
Fred is w
rong. 
- It is not okay to hit people just because you feel like it, so Fred is right 
and John is w
rong.
- There is no fact of the m
atter about unqualified claim
s like “It’s okay to 
hit people just because you feel like it.” D
ifferent cultures believe differ-
ent things, and it is not absolutely true or false that it’s okay to hit people 
just because you feel like it. (N
ichols, 2004, p. 9-10)
N
ichols assum
es that selecting the first or second answ






. This is because selecting the first or sec-
In m
y discussion of psychological research on folk m
etaethics in the next sec-
tion I w




e have, then, the follow
ing core criteria for FM
O
:
Independence: People believe that m
oral sentences are true or false in-
dependently of anyone’s subjective reactions or attitudes





ity: Independence and Exclusion hold for all m
oral beliefs
Independence and Exclusion are both necessary for FM
O. They are reject-
ed by people w
ho are m
oral subjectivists (m
oral sentences are true or false 
in virtue of the existence of subjective facts), by nihilists and error theorists 
(there are no true m
oral sentences), and by non-cognitivists (m
oral sentences 
are neither true nor false
1). In light of the fact that it is contested w
hether or 
not a violation of Uniform




in light of em
pirical research, but leave it to m
y reader to decide on its im
-
portance.  
2. Psychological Research on Folk M
etaethics 
In m
y evaluation of FM
O
 on the basis of Independence, Exclusion, and Uni-
form
ity, I w
ill take specific em
pirical studies as point of departure. I w
ill start 
w
ith discussing research by N
ichols (2004), w
hich is the first em
pirical study 
that explicitly takes FM
O
 as point of departure. Subsequently, I w
ill discuss 
the results of research using truth-aptness and disagreem
ent tasks, w
hich 
have been developed by Goodw
in and D
arley (2008, 2012) and have becom
e 
standard tests in this field of research. Finally, I w
ill discuss research by Pöl-
zler and W
right (unpublished) w
ho used truth-aptness and disagreem
ent 






e non-cognitivists endorse m
inim





cognitivists to say that m
oral claim
s are truth-apt. 
13
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w
e w












in that participants interpret it in a w
ay that has no bearing on FM
O. For in-
stance, it is not entirely clear w









hether or not they believe there are objectively true or false m
oral judg-
m
ents) or instead m




not it is okay to hit som
eone because you feel like it). If it is the latter, the 






ichols (2004) uses as input for the scenario 
is fairly extraordinary. I conjecture that people w
ill rarely, if ever, consider 
m
oral cases that concern the issue of w
hether or not it is okay to hit som
eone 
because they feel like it. The extraordinariness of this case m
ay induce peo-
ple to provide a response that does not reflect how




f course, one could also argue that such borderline 
cases are especially relevant for evaluating FM
O. Indeed, philosophers often 
use quite radical exam
ples to test their intuitions. In fact, the scenario used 
by N





e people do not express their disapproval. Consequently, w
e 




e to a conclusive assessm
ent of w
hether or not FM
O







In this section I w






ere the first to adm






easure Independence and Ex-
clusion. For the truth-aptness task, participants w
ere presented w
ith a range 
of statem
ents from
 each of the dom
ains and they w
ere then asked w
hether 
those statem
ents are true or false or w
hether they are opinions or attitudes 












es that people w
ho select the 
first or second answ
er option deny the third answ
er option. The third answ
er 




hich is a rejection of both Independence (because 
there are no objectively true or false m
oral sentences) and Exclusion (be-
cause both parties can be correct) 2. If N
ichols’ interpretation of the respons-
es of his participants is correct, the first and second answ
er option m
easures 
Independence and Exclusion and the third answ
er denies both.
 
The results of his first study show
 that 17 out of 40 participants respond 
that there is no fact of the m
atter about hitting som
eone because you feel like 
it. 3 In a second study, 9 out of 40 participants responded that there is no fact 
of the m
atter about the m
oral statem
ent involving hitting people because you 
feel like it. In a different study, N
ichols used a scenario involving aliens from
 
a different planet w
ho believe that it is ok to torture puppies for the fun of it. 
In this case, 15 out of 40 participants responded that there is no fact of the 
m
atter about the statem




 of participants in N
ichols’ research respond in w
ays 
that are in tension w




 respond in accordance w




 to believe that there are no objective 
m
oral facts that can arbitrate m
oral disagreem
ents and others seem
 to be-
lieve there are. If FM
O
 is true, it is surprising to find that a sizable m
inority of 
people responds that there are no objective m
oral facts. At the sam
e tim
e, it 
is also true that a m
ajority of people does respond in a w




e should not base our assessm
ent of FM
O
 only on the 
research by N
ichols (2004). In order to assess an em
pirical thesis like FM
O, 
2 I assum
e here that non-philosophers interpret the term
 ‘absolutely’ in N
ichols’study as being 
roughly sim
ilar to how
 I use the term
 ‘objectively’ in this paper. 
3 N
ichols also tested how
 participants respond to factual statem
ents (i.e. w
hether the earth 
is flat) and excluded participants w
ho believe that there is no fact of the m
atter about 
such statem
ents. Strikingly, respectively 3, 6, and 12 participants for the first three studies 
responded that there is no fact of the m
atter about the flat-earth scenario.
15
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At first sight, this seem
s to be a straightforw
ard m




y evaluation as if this is indeed the case, 
but I w





arley use a com
posite score of both the truth-aptness and 
disagreem
ent task in their presentation of results. The com
posite score has 
three different categories: Fully objective, interm
ediately objective, and least 
objective. If participants perceived a m
oral statem
ent to be true or false and 
regarded that at m




as labelled as fully objective and applies to 50%
 of the cases. If participants 
rated a m
oral statem
ent as true or false or regarded that at m
ost one person 
can be correct in a disagreem
ent about the statem
ent, this w
as labelled as 
interm
ediately objective, w
hich applies to 28%
 of the cases. If participants 
denied that a m
oral statem
ent can be true or false and they allow
ed for the 
possibilities that both parties can be correct, this w
as labelled as the least 
objective response, w
hich applies to 11%










ple do not consistently treat m
oral statem
ents in a w
ay that corresponds to In-
dependence or m
oral disagreem
ents in a w
ay that corresponds to Exclusion. 
H
ence, w




correspond to these criteria. M
oreover, w
e observe that there are large indi-
vidual differences and that people’s responses strongly differ based on m
oral 
content. There are no individuals w




ay that corresponds to Independence and Exclusion. There are also no 
m
oral statem
ents that are consistently treated in a w
ay that corresponds to 
both criteria. W
hat w
e observe instead is that people treat som
e m
oral beliefs 
as true or false in accordance w
ith Independence and Exclusion but not the 
w
hole set of m
oral beliefs. H
ence, Uniform








hether you believe that the uniform
ity assum
ption is true or false. If you 
believe that the uniform
ity assum
ption is true then these findings appear to 
4  In another 11%
 of the cases participants selected the answ
er option“O
ther”in the case of a 
m
oral disagreem
ent, and those responses could therefore not be categorized.
w
hile the option “opinions or attitudes” are interpreted as a rejection of Inde-
pendence. For now, I w
ill assum





return to this issue.
 
The results on the truth-aptness m
easure show
 that, on average, the six 
cases representing factual statem
ents are each overw
helm
ingly rated as true 
or false (>90%





ain that is charac-
teristically objective (i.e. the dom
ain of scientific facts). This is not w
hat w
e 
observe for the m
oral cases. The nine different m
oral cases w
ere on average 
rated only in 38%








ters of taste w




ost strikingly, people’s scores on the truth-aptness m
easure vary strong-
ly on the basis of the content of the m
oral statem




ly shooting other people on the street or about 
cheating on an exam
 are respectively judged in 68%
 and 54%
 of the cases as 
true or false. Statem
ents involving donating to charity (36%
), assisting in the 
death of a term
inally ill friend (8%
), perform
ing stem
 cell research (2%
), and 
abortion (2%
), are not at all judged as true or false but are perceived as opin-
ion or attitudes instead. 
 
In the second phase of the experim
ent participants w








ents they strongly agreed or disagreed w
ith in the truth-aptness task. They 
w
ere then told that som
eone else in the study disagreed strongly w
ith them
 
about the content of the statem
ent. Subsequently, participants w




(1) The other person is surely m
istaken
(2) It is possible that neither you nor the other person is m
istaken
(3) It could be that you are m
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m
ay introduce a confounder variable (see also Pölzler, 2018). It m
ay induce 
participants to interpret this question as being about how
 certain they feel 
about their responses. M
oreover, in the disagreem
ent task used by Goodw
in 
and D
arley (2008), the backgrounds of the parties involved in the m
oral dis-
agreem
ent are roughly presented as being sim





e cannot assess w
hether or not participants judge 
in accordance w
ith Exclusion because they are m
oral objectivists or for som
e 
other reason. Indeed, a cultural relativist can respond that at m
ost one party is 
correct because they assum
e that the parties involved share their ow
n cultural 
background (Sarkissian et al. 2012).  M
oreover, Pölzler (2018) notices that this 
m




eans that they believe that m
oral judgm




on-cognitivists do not think that it is possible to 
be correct or to be m
istaken in a m
oral disagreem
ent 6. Consequently, there 
is no answ
er option that they can select. In light of these considerations, the 
disagreem
ent task as used by Goodw
in and D
arley (2008) does not strictly 
m
easure Exclusion and provides no evidence for or against FM
O.   
2.3 A
 different experim




ill discuss research by Pölzler and W
right.  They take sig-
nificant m
ethodological steps to ensure that research on folk m
etaethics is 
high in construct validity and avoids the problem




ents used in previous research. H
ow
ever, I w





As I interpret Pölzler and W
right, tw
o assum
ptions underlie their basic 
approach. First, in order to avoid m
isunderstanding or different interpreta-
tions of m
etaethical concepts, Pölzler and W
right m
ake the thesis of FM
O
 as 




5  Participants are inform
ed that another participant of the study disagrees w
ith them
 about the content of 
a m
oral statem
ent. It is likely that participants therefore assum





ith the exception of quasi-realists w
ho do allow
 this (Blackburn, 1984, 1993).
show
 that people violate Uniform
ity and that FM
O
 is false. If you believe that 
the uniform
ity assum
ption is false, it is possible to interpret these findings 
as support for FM













ever, does the truth-aptness task genuinely m
easure Independence 
and does the disagreem
ent task m
easure Exclusion? As I w




a facie to pertain to Independence. Yet, 
this becom
es less apparent on a closer exam
ination. For the truth-aptness 
task to m
easure Independence, for instance, participants should interpret 
each of the answ
er options as I described them
 above, nam
ely “True” and 
“False” as objectively true or false and “opinion or attitude” as representing 





er options are am
biguous. For exam
ple, the fact that 
a m
oral statem
ent is treated as “True” or “False” does not m
ean that people 
believe that the statem
ent is objectively true or false. It is also possible that 
they believe that it is subjectively true or false. M
oreover, participants w
ho se-
lect the option “False” m
ay do so because they believe there are no true m
or-
al statem
ents (see also Pölzler, 2018). Finally, the fact that participants select 
the option “opinion or attitude” does not necessarily provide evidence against 
FM
O. Indeed, both opinions and the content of attitudes can be objectively true 
or false. That is, som
eone m
ay believe that the statem
ent ‘abortion is m
orally 
w
rong’ is an opinion and yet objectively true (or false). The reason, for instance, 
w
hy this person nevertheless does not select “True” or “False” is because s/he 
is careful about expressing his or her m
oral view
s to others.  Consequently, re-
search that used this particular form
ulation of the truth-aptness m
easure m
ay 















It is also unclear w
hether or not the disagreem
ent task directly pertains 
to Exclusion. The reason is that the use of the term
 “surely” in the first an-
sw
er option and the phrase “It could be that…
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ay actually be m
oral 
subjectivists. That is, people w
ho are cultural relativists, and reject FM
O, m
ay 
appear to respond in accordance w
ith Exclusion, and hence seem
 to support 
FM
O, in cases w
here the parties to the disagreem
ent belong to the sam
e cul-
ture as they do. 
 
Strikingly, 92%
 of participants deny that at m
ost one party can be correct. 
H
ence, the vast m
ajority of people reject Exclusion. Given that this is a direct 
m
easure of Exclusion and one that excludes the possibility that people are 
m
oral subjectivists, this result appears to provide direct evidence against FM
O. 
 
For the concrete disagreem
ent m
easure, participants w
ere asked to con-
sider each statem
ent that they classified as m






e culture. Those w
ho responded 
in accordance w
ith Exclusion then responded to a follow
-up question. For 
this task, w
e sim
ilarly observe that on average 92%
 of participants respond 
in a w
ay that fits w









ilarly provide evidence against FM
O
? For an ab-
stract theory task, participants read a description of the three m
ain questions 
that determ







oral sentences intend to state m
oral facts?”, “If yes, do these facts 
exist?”, “And if yes, are they independent from
 w
hat anybody thinks about 
them
?” For the answ
er options, participants w
ere provided w
ith a range of 
descriptions of different m




and theory, cultural relativism
, individual subjectivism
, error theory, and 
non-cognitivism
.  The rationale behind using these tasks, as described above, 
seem
s to be based on the assum
ption that the construct validity of research 
is im
proved if participants respond to questions that contain as m
axim
ally 
accurate descriptions of m
oral objectivism
. 
and the different types of rejections of FM




ind, Pölzler and W
right decided to partly replicate previous re-
search, nam
ely by adm
inistering both abstract and concrete truth-aptness 
and disagreem
ent tasks but in such a w
ay that issues of construct validity are 
avoided. M





ely an abstract theory task, m
etaphor task, and com
parison task. This 
w




than previous research has done.
 
For the abstract truth-aptness task, participants read a description of 
w
hat m
akes sentences truth-apt and not truth-apt. They w
ere subsequently 
asked w
hether truth-aptness applies to m
oral statem
ents or not. 73%
 of par-
ticipants indicated that statem
ents are truth-apt. For the concrete truth-apt-
ness task, participants judged different m
oral statem
ents and they w
ere then 
asked to judge for each of those statem
ents if those statem
ents are truth-apt 
or not. O
n average, in 76%
 of the cases participants judged those sentences to 
be truth-apt. Consequently, people are largely inclined to believe that m
oral 
statem
ents are truth-apt. Given that truth-aptness does not directly pertain 




truth-aptness is a precondition for m
oral objectivism
 and the results here at 
least suggest that people, w
ho have been elaborately inform
ed about w
hat 
truth-aptness entails, respond that they believe that m
oral sentences are true 
or false.   
 
For the abstract disagreem
ent m





bers of the sam
e culture. They w
ere then 
presented w
ith different interpretations of that disagreem
ent each of w
hich 
corresponds to different m
etaethical view
s. O
ne interpretation, for instance, 
is that one of the parties is right and the other person is w
rong, w
hich is a de-
scription of w
hat Exclusion entails. Participants w
ho provided a response that 








 different cultures 
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By using this description, this task only m
easures Independence insofar par-
ticipants believe that m
oral facts are like scientific facts. That is, som
eone 
w
ho believes that m
oral sentences can be true or false in an objective w
ay 




select this option. If so, it is not clear w




etaphor task, only 13%
 of participants selected the m





s to be a strong rejection of m
oral objectivism
 
but it depends on w
hether people believe m
oral facts are like scientific facts.
 
Finally, participants responded to an abstract com
parison task. In this 













atics and again a reference w
as m
ade to discovering m
oral 
facts. As w
ith the previous m
easure, negative answ
ers do not have to entail 
that FM
O
 is false. This depends on w
hether people believe that m
oral truth 
can be discovered like scientific truth. The results show
 that 10%
 of partici-
pants select the answ




In short, at the start of this section I rem
arked that the next logical step 
for research into folk m
etaethics w
as to construct studies w
ith high construct 
validity. Pölzler and W
right aim





high construct validity. Their approach w
as to avoid problem
s inherent to 
previous research and to be theoretically explicit about FM
O
 and the different 
m
etaethical view




hat does this elaborate investigation tell us about FM
O
? First, the results 
suggest that m
ost people believe that m
oral sentences are truth-apt. This does 
not m
ean that people support Independence, because they can believe m
oral 
sentences are subjectively true. Second, people overw
helm
ingly reject Exclu-
sion both in the concrete and in the abstract disagreem
ent task. This appears 
to be strong evidence against FM
O. Third, w
hen asked to evaluate different 
descriptions of m
orality (i.e. the Theory task), only 20%
 of participants select 
an option that corresponds to FM











hen a person says that som
ething is m
orally right or w
rong, good or bad, 
etc. she intends to state a fact. Such facts exist – and they are indepen-
dent from
 w
hat anybody thinks about them
. For exam






hat anyone thinks. So it w
ould still 
be w
rong even if you yourself, or the m
ajority of the m
em
bers of your cul-





The results show, strikingly, that only 20%
 of participants select this option. 
The vast m
ajority, 80%
 of participants, select an option that conflicts w
ith 
Independence. Consequently, the results on the theory task also appear to 




hat about the results on a m
etaphor task?  Participants w
ere asked to 
select from
 a variety of m
etaphors describing different m
etaethical view
s. 
They first read the follow
ing description:
This task is about m
oral facts. M




rong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, and so on. For exam
-
ple, it could be a m
oral fact that it is (or is not) w
rong to break prom
ises, 
or that the U




oral facts are explained in term
s of several m
eta-
phors. W
hich of these m
etaphors seem
 m
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 Enoch’s reasoning, findings of psychological studies are 

















e suggests that it is possible to 
be explicitly com
m






itted to a different thesis instead. Enoch boldly claim
s: “You m
ay think 
that you’re a m
oral relativist or subjectivist – m
any people today seem
 to. But 
I don’t think you are” (Enoch, 2014, p. 193). People m
ay explicitly believe that 
they are m
oral relativists or m
oral subjectivists w















al thought and discourse versus being engaged in m
oral thinking and debate. 
Indeed, Björnsson claim
s that “the prim
ary task of m
etaethical theories is to 
account for this engaged behavior, rather than for w
hat is in effect lay people’s 
theoretical interpretations of it” (Björnsson, 2012, p. 9). I assum
e that w
hat 









and practices. Just like Brink and Enoch, Björnsson believes that people’s the-
oretical ideas about the status of m
orality are irrelevant.
 
The crucial question that w
e have to answ
er is then w
hether or not the 









ents. This is a diffi
cult question to answ
er because w
e first 
need a tool that w
e can use to identify im




This is itself an em
pirical question that has not been properly investigated 




















ple to theoretically speculate about the status of m
orality and provide a cog-
nitive response instead of providing an answ




 they think about m
oral issues, or w
hat 
Given the responses on the Theory task and the fact that people appear to re-
ject Exclusion, it appears that FM
O
 is false. H
ow




 is only false if w




ents people have about the pertinent issues. In the next section, 
I w
ill argue that this need not be the case.
3. Im
plicit and Explicit M
oral Objectivism
 
In this section I w







oral truth and that FM
O
 m
ay apply to only one of them
. This distinc-
tion is based on tw




that people can have, nam
ely the distinction betw
een im




ents. Philosophers have at this point not m





ents but they have gestured at an intuitive difference 
betw
een both. M
oreover, there are som
e philosophers w
ho seem





ents have evidentiary status w





ple, that it is the presuppositions that under-
lie ordinary m
oral discourse and practices that show
 that people are m
oral 
objectivists. People’s theoretical beliefs, on the other hand, have no bearing 
on the question of w
hether people are m





]hat is relevant is not the explicit m
etanorm





ents – of participants in norm
ative 
discourse. W









ative discourse and 
practice them
selves. The fact that m
any sophom
ores (and not only them
) 
express som
e subjectivist or relativist m
etanorm
ative intuitions thus has 
very little w





(2005, p. 773, footnote 31) 
25
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W
hat seem
s reasonable to conclude, then, is that if FM
O




ents, it is false. But if FM
O






e need to design em
pirical studies that m
easure these. At this point, 
w
e w
ill therefore have to conclude that existing em




In this paper, I investigated w
hether or not there is em
pirical evidence for 
the philosophical assum
ption that people believe that m
oral judgm
ents are 
objectively true or false, w
hich I term



































ents. To the extent that FM
O
 pertains to explicit com
m
itm
ents, it is 
likely that FM
O
 is false. To the extent, how
ever, that FM
O
















y view, studies that used scenarios or questions that refer to specific 
m
etaethical view
s or that used theoretically laden concepts or m
etaethical 
jargon m
ay have activated an explicit m
ode of thinking in people (N
ichols 
2004; Sarkissian et al. 2012; Pölzler &
 W
right, unpublished). If so, people m
ay 
have speculated about their answ




plicitly believe is the case. Sim
ilarly, any research 
that used an experim










ple, participants in m
ost research using truth-aptness and 
disagreem
ent m
easures had to respond to a variety of m
oral statem
ents. It is 
likely that the repetitive character inclines them
 to provide responses that do 
not reflect how
 they ordinarily think about these cases. M
ore specifically, the 
repetitive nature of the experim
ent m
ay have influenced people to provide 
reasoned instead of intuitive answ
ers. M
oreover, the sheer fact that people 
ordinarily do not explicitly reflect on w
hether or not a m
oral statem
ent is true 
or false, or w
hether a m
oral disagreem
ent concerns exclusionary content, 
m
ay already have activated them






Consequently, it is hard to rule out that these studies m
easure theoretical 
conceptions of an explicit sort that m
etaethicists claim
 provide no insight on 
FM
O. This m
eans, of course, that w
e cannot straightforw
















y view, it is very likely that Pölzler and W
right’s research design 
caused participants to m
ostly provide explicit com
m
itm
ents. This is because 
participants w
ere provided w
ith explicit theoretical conceptions of different 
m
etaethical concepts and view
s. M
oreover, the distinction betw
een norm
a-
tive ethics and m
etaethics w




ode of thinking. 
2.FOLK M
ORAL OBJECTIVISM
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Introduction
In the past decade, psychologists and philosophers have started to investigate 
w
hether people perceive m
oral judgm
ents to be objectively true or false by 
probing intuitions about m
oral objectivity. Existing research focuses on w
hat 
is know
n as ‘perceived objectivity’ 9. This is often probed by tw
o different ques-
tions, nam













Grandjean 2014). The form
er m
easures w
hether or not people believe that 
m
oral judgm
ents are true or false. The latter m
easures how





hether or not one party is m
istaken or that 
both can be correct. This em
erging research literature has found large differ-
ences in objectivity ascriptions betw

















oral objectivity on a sin-
gle dim
ension of perceived objectivity
10. There are, how
ever, good reasons 
to regard folk m
oral objectivity as m
ultidim




ents as objective can have diverging reasons for doing so. 
Som
e people believe, for instance, that objective m
orality is constructed by 
the com
m
ands of a divine entity (Piazza &









true because they are derived from
 m
ore basic m
oral truths (Kant 1785/1959). 
Second, som
eone w
ho does not regard m










ight hold that m
oral judgm
ents do not purport to 








s. In light of G
oodw
in and D




oral objectivity, this research attem










ents to be objectively true or false. Existing research 
focuses on a single dim





ensions of folk m
oral objectivity underlie 
m
oral judgm
ents. It also exam
ines w
hether such dim
ensions relate to 
perceived objectivity, tolerance, and people’s behavioral intentions to punish 
norm




ays of perceiving m




 reliable subscales (Study 1). This three-
factor structure w
as supported by confirm
atory factor analysis (Study 2). Each 
of the dim
ensions is differently related to perceived objectivity (Study 3). W
ith 
respect to tolerance, perceived objectivity is a m
ediator in the relationship 
betw
een perceiving m
oral truth as absolute or universal and tolerance 
(Study 4). W
ith respect to a w
illingness to harm
 m
easure, Independent Truth 
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2. Beyond Perceived Objectivity
2.1. O




ental research has focused on perceived objectivity, w
hich has 





ension of perceived objectivity captures folk attitudes tow
ards 
the truth or falsity of m
oral judgm
ents. People’s intuitions about this m
atter 
m
ight vary on m
ultiple dim





and theory, and the view






 and divine com
m








ents are true only if they are based on universally binding m
oral norm
s 







sler, 2013). An exam
ple of m
oral universalism





an Rights. Article 1 of the declaration states 
that “all hum
an beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” and 
according to article 3 “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 






 goes beyond universalism
 in that it also holds that true 
m
oral judgm
ents are derived from
 m
ore basic m
oral truths. The underlying 
idea is that the core of m
orality is determ
ined by a set of general rules and 
principles w
hich all hold true, w
ithout exception (W
ong 2006). Kant argued, 
for exam
ple, that m
oral obligations derive from
 the Categorical Im
perative, 
w
hich denotes the absolute m
oral requirem
ent that one should “act only ac-
cording to that m
axim
 by w
hich you can at the sam
e tim
e w
ill that it should 
becom
e a universal law
” (1785/1959, p. 421). Kant fam
ously argued that this 
im
plies that lying is prohibited even if you could save som







and theory is the view
 that w
hether an action is m
orally right 
or w
rong depends on the com
m
ands of a divine being (M
urphy, 1998; Q
uinn, 
1978). In other w
ords, true m
oral judgm





ere expressions of the subjective em
otional states (Ayer 
1936; Blackburn 1993) 11.
 
To contribute to existing experim
ental research on perceived objectivi-
















hat I call ‘no-truth’. The m
ain innovation 
is that the FM
O
-scale allow
s for the possibility that folk m
oral objectivity 
has several dim
ensions. The scale is designed to test w
hether folk intuitions 
about m
oral objectivity are best captured in term
s of a single psychological 
construct or by different psychological constructs. If folk attitudes tow
ard 
m





plications for a w
ide range of experim
ental research 
in social psychology, including the w
ays in w
hich experim
ental studies on 
folk m
oral objectivity have to be conducted. 
 
I w
ill first introduce different philosophical view
s that can underlie m
oral 
judgm
ent and I discuss how
 the m
ultidim
ensionality of folk m
oral objectivity 
has im
plications for different lines of research in social psychology. In Study 
1, I use exploratory factor analysis to test w






easuring five distinct ethical view
s. This yields a 
three-factor structure and reliable subscales. In Study 2, I test w
hether the 
three-factor structure is supported by confirm
atory factor analysis. Studies 
3-5 serve to investigate w
hether the scale dim
ensions relate to perceived ob-
jectivity, tolerance, and w
illingness to harm
.
11  In analytical philosophy, this view
 on the sem
antics of m
oral statem
ents falls under the heading 
of non-cognitivism
.  A







ents do not intend to describe m
atters of facts but are perceived as w
ays of expressing non-
cognitive m
ental states such as feelings, em
otions or desires. 
33
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different relationships that exist betw
een these different view
s also constitute 







an psychology. A related question is w
hether and 
how
 they relate to people’s tolerance tow
ard m




2.2 The predictive pow
er of folk m
oral objectivism
Although people’s attitudes tow
ards m
oral truth and falsity are interesting 
as such, it is also w





ake a difference to people’s tolerance judgm
ents and behavioral intentions. 
As it turns out, there is large variation in perceived objectivity, both intra-
personal and interpersonal, w








hite 2013).  M
oreover, perceived objectivity is re-
lated to social distance (Sarkissian, Park, Tien, W
right &




arley 2008; Sarkissian &
 Phelan 2019; Yilm
az 
&
 Bahçekapili 2015), and age (Beebe, Q
iaoan, W
ysocki &
 Endara 2015; Beebe 
&
 Sackris, 2016). People w
ith high scores on the personality trait of being 
open to experience tend to be m
oral relativists (Feltz and Cokely 2008). Those 
w





objectivists than those w




 that relativists score higher on disjunc-
tive thinking. 
 
As Sarkissian and Phelan (2019) observe, philosophers have suggested a 
relationship betw
een religion and m
oral objectivity for m
ore than tw
o thou-
sand years. Sarkissian and Phelan’s research show
s that there is also an intri-
cate psychological relationship betw
een religion and m
oral objectivity. For 
exam
ple, one study show
s that belief in a punishing God predicts people’s 
rejection of m
oral relativism
. In a different study, the authors show
 that prim
-
ing religious believers belonging to Abraham
ic faiths w
ith divinity concepts 
increases their objectivity ascriptions. M
oreover, the researchers show
 that 
w
hen people are generally prom
pted to believe in objective m
orality, they 
Those w




orality, then, is w
hat a divine being prescribes and act-
ing m
orally consists of obeying divine com
m
ands. Each of these three positions 
entails perceived objectivity (see below














ight still subscribe to universalism
.  
 


















ight be a relativist 
and hold that the truth or falsity of a m
oral judgm





ong, 2006). Second, people m
ight also deny 
that there are m
oral truths. Perhaps they regard m
oral judgm
ents as nei-
ther true nor false because they are expressions of em
otions, w
hich have no 
truth-value (expressivism
; Ayer, 1936; Stevenson 1944, 1963). They could also 
believe that all m
oral beliefs are false (the error theory; Joyce, 2006; M
ackie, 






e of the view





akes it rather unlikely that these posi-
tions reflect different dim




 (and believe that norm
s have universal application) w
ithout 
subscribing to absolutism
 (and believing that such norm





ore, it is inform
ative to see to w
hat 
extent people’s responses reflect the degree to w
hich positions are sim
ilar 
conceptually. It is possible that people‘s endorsem
ent of these view
s is pre-






s either entail perceived objectivity or its denial. The point of the 
studies presented below
 is to determ
ine w





ps. In order to tease this out, the FM
O
-scale does 
not include perceived objectivity as such. Instead, the relations betw
een the 
above view
s and perceived objectivity are used to validate the scale. N
ote that 
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The idea that people’s treatm
ent of m




oral issues (i.e. conventions, preferences, 
taste, etc.) has been w
ell established by existing research. From
 a young age, 
children have the basic capacity to distinguish m
oral violations (e.g. hitting 
som
eone) from
 conventional violations (e.g. talking out of turn) (Turiel, 1983, 
1998; Sm
etana, 1981, 1983; Sm
etana and Braeges, 1990). People perceive vi-
olations of m
oral rules as less perm
issible and m
ore serious than violations 
of conventional rules. M
oreover, m
oral rules are perceived as authority-in-
dependent w
hile conventional rules are perceived as authority-dependent 
(i.e., issued by decree of an authority figure or institution: m
oral rules cannot 
be changed in this w
ay). Violations of m
oral rules are also perceived as gen-
eralizably w
rong (i.e. w
rong in other countries too) w
hile the w
rongness of 
conventional violations is perceived as local (i.e., w
rong in a specific social 
situation, or culturally specific). Finally, justifications for m
oral rules are of-




hile justifications of conventional 
rules are given in term
s of social acceptability. 
 
The psychological distinction betw
een m
oral and non-m
oral attitudes is 
also show
n by the relationship that m
oral attitudes have w
ith interpersonal 
tolerance. H
aidt, Rosenberg, and H
om
 (2003) show
 that people are least sup-
portive of m
oral diversity com
pared to other kinds of diversity. M
oreover, 
perceiving an issue as m
oral instead of conventional increases people’s in-
tolerance tow
ard m











ple’s preferred social and physical distance tow
ard m
orally divergent others, it 
decrease people’s goodw
ill and cooperativeness to resolve m
oral conflicts, and 
m
ake people less w




 Skitka 2006; Skitka et al. 2005; Skitka &
 M
ullen 2002).  W
hat 
is crucial is that m
oral m
andates explain unique variance beyond otherw
ise 
strong non-m
oral attitudes (Skitka et al. 2005). H





oral attitudes, but w
hat is it?
are also m
ore inclined to believe in a punishing God. Yilm
az and Bahçekapili 
(2015) observed a sim
ilar relationship betw
een religion and people’s attitudes 
tow
ard m





e increasingly objectivistic about m
orality, and w
hen 





e less convinced 




ined in particular circum






and ethics is a separate dim



















2014). Perceived objectivity is associated w
ith how
 com
















as likely to donate to charity (Young and D
urw









ore likely to cheat on an incentivized raf-
fle and to engage in petty theft (Rai &
 H





oral behavior). This suggests 
that there is individual variation in how
 people construe m
oral judgm
ents. 
And this opens up the intriguing possibility that those w
ho agree about a 
particular m




ay have different tolerance judgm
ents tow
ard others because they disagree 
about the status of m
oral judgm
ents. In short, there is a surge of research on 
the effects of folk attitudes tow
ard m
oral truth on a range of different varia-
bles. H
ow
ever, the relevance of research on folk m
oral objectivity goes be-
yond research on perceived objectivity.
2.3 The psychological distinctiveness of m
oral attitudes
The fact that people have different view
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and found large variance betw






 in objectivity ascriptions m
ay occur 
w
hen individuals are presented w
ith disagreem
ent tasks about different m
or-
al issues. It is also possible, how
ever, that folk attitudes tow
ard m
oral truth are 
m
ulti-dim
ensional and that individuals have different scores on each of the 
dim
ensions. This m
ay, in turn, be differently related to perceived objectivity. 





ent scale of m
oral objectivity (Study 1). Subsequently, the three-factor 
structure that w
as found w
as tested in a confirm
atory factor analysis (Study 
2). The next three studies serve to establish the validity of the scale. Study 3 
investigates the relationships betw
een how
 people score on this scale on the 
one hand and perceived objectivity on the other. Study 4 concerns the rela-









4. Study 1: Developm
ent of the M
easurem
ent Scale
To investigate people’s m
oral intuitions, the participants in this study w
ere 
presented w
ith a range of statem
ents. The survey item
s are based on the po-






 and no-truth. The point of the construction of a scale is to detect 
latent constructs. This requires exploratory factor analysis rather than prin-
cipal com
ponent analysis (Tabachnik &
 Fidell, 2001). Participants’ responses 
w





extraction to test the underlying factor structure. It w
as then tested w
hether 
each of the three latent factors that w
ere found form
 reliable scales that can 
be used as dependent and independent variables in subsequent studies. For 
this study and all studies that are part of this research and are presented be-
low, all m
easures, m




ined before any data analysis. 
O
ne thing that is special about m
oral attitudes according to research on the 
distinction betw
een m
oral and conventional rules is that people generalize 
m
oral rules and violations. People are inclined to generalize m
oral rules to 
other contexts and situations, including different countries and cultures. This 
strongly resem
bles the philosophical view
 of m
oral universalism
 that I dis-
cussed above. H
aidt, Rosenberg and H
om
 (2003, p. 6-7) explicitly build on the 
idea that people perceive m
oral judgm
ents to apply universally. 
 
W




according to Skitka et al. (2005) is that people perceive m
oral judgm
ents as 
having universal application, that m
oral convictions refer to absolute beliefs 
that som
ething is right or w
rong, and that m
oral convictions are perceived as 
facts about the w
orld. Citing Shw
eder (2002), Skitka et al. (2005) w
rite that “[G]
ood and bad are experienced as objective characteristics of phenom
ena and 
not just as verbal labels that people attach to feelings” ” (Skitka et al. 2005, p. 
896-897). 
 






 to explain the effects 
that m
oral attitudes have beyond non-m
oral attitudes. Given that these are 
distinct philosophical view
s, it is unclear w
hether they are a psychological 
conjoint, as assum
ed by existing research, or that they play different psycho-
logical roles. If folk m





es possible that these view
s play different psychological roles, and that 
they have different relationships to interpersonal tolerance and other varia-
bles of interest. It is therefore im
perative that w
e investigate w
hether or not 
w
hat is assum





truth and falsity - fits on a single dim




3. The Present Research
The goal of this paper is to investigate folk attitudes tow
ards m
oral truth and 
falsity. Existing research m
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ES EM
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of God, nothing is truly m




and “It is an illusion to think that anything is really m
orally true or false” 
(no-truth). This yielded tw
enty item
s in five different categories. Item
s w
ere 
not reverse-scored for the purpose of factor analysis. Existing literature on 
scale construction w
arns against reverse scoring because it can lead to m
is-
interpretation of item













2008). The results of the participants’ responses w
ere analyzed using explor-
atory factor analysis. 
Table 1. Item
s and factor loadings Study 1 and scatterplot for the 














hat people believe, are brought 
up to believe, or w
ant to believe about it, 











All ideas about w
hat is m
orally right and 
m
orally w
rong are products of individuals, 
cultures, and com
m









hat people believe to be m
orally right and 
w
rong are m
erely social conventions that 







It is an illusion to think that anything is really 
m








o people have opposing beliefs about 
a m
oral issue, it is not necessarily the case 







There is not one but m
any different answ
ers 
to the question of w
hat is m
orally right and 
w









orally right and w
rong is 













orally right and w
rong is relative to 
the m










orally right or w
rong is 
the sam







4.1.1 Participants     
Four hundred fourteen participants w
ere recruited via the online service M
e-







echanical Turk provides an appropriate pool of research 




 Gosling, 2011; Paolacci &
 Chandler, 2014). Participants w
ho did not 
com
plete the survey or failed to answ
er attention checks correctly (N
 = 10) 
w
ere excluded from
 statistical analyses. The attention checks consisted of an 
item
 in the m




ord “Purple” and to rate “strongly agree” to that item
. Participants 
w
ere requested to fill out this code in a box on a new
 screen at the end of the 
study. Analyses w
ere conducted on the rem
aining 404 participants. 
4.1.2 M
aterials and Procedure
Participants received 20 item
s in a random
 order and w
ere asked to rate the 
item










ere developed on the basis of philosophical literature 
on m
oral philosophy. They w
ere further refined by consulting experienced phi-
losophers and psychologists at three different universities and by brainstorm
 
sessions at lab group m






, and no-truth) of item
s 
em
erged (see Table 1). For exam
ple, item
s included “W
ithout the existence 
41
42













 AND ITS M
EASUREM
ENT  CHAPTER 2











s by factor 10, w
hich sug-
gests a sam
ple of at least 400 participants (Velicer &
 Fava, 1998).
 
The data provides evidence for the existence of three separate factors. The 
significance of Bartlett’s test for sphericity (χ5132.49 = (190)2, p < 0.001) and 
the value for the Kaiser-M
ayer-Olkin test of .938 indicates excellent sam
pling 
adequacy (Kaiser, 1974; Tabachnik &
 Fidell, 2001). Eigenvalues, proportion 
variance explained, and factor loadings are reported in Table 1 and figure 1 
visually depicts the distribution of scores betw




s of these three factors loaded highly on only one factor 
and there are no cross-loadings. This indicates that the factors are distinct and 
it m
akes the three-factor structure interpretable and theoretically m
eaningful. 
Each factor contains item
s that strongly discrim
inate w
ith item
s of a different 
factor. Eight item
s loaded on the first factor, four item
s loaded on the second 
factor, and eight item
s loaded on the third factor. The values of these indica-
tors suggest that the m
easurem
ent scale has excellent content validity. Con-
sequently, the factors seem
 quite able to grasp the unobservable constructs 
under investigation. In light of the fact that item
-developm
ent w
as based on 
theoretical considerations by consulting academ
ic literature and experts in 
com
bination w
ith the above results, it w
as decided to create a m
easurem
ent 
scale out of these item
s and not to expand the list of item
s at this point.


























 is also m
orally right and w
rong for 
people elsew
here, even for people living in dif-











individuals, cultures, and societies, there are 
m
oral norm






Although people disagree about w
hat is m
or-
ally right and w
rong, I believe in the existence 
of specific m









Certain actions are m
orally w




rong even in the rare case 






There are absolute m
oral rules that apply 
to all people, including those w








There is, in all circum
stances, one correct 
answ
er about w
hat is the m









er to any m
oral issue can be 
found in a sacred book or text (for exam
ple, 
the Bible, the Q
































ithout the existence of God, nothing is truly 
m
orally right or w
rong
Eigenvalues     
%















4.1.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis
For all tw
enty item












ent of latent constructs possible and also allow
ed factors to 
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to form
 one dim
ension, Universal Truth. Given how
 close they are conceptual-
ly, this is not very surprising either. 12 
 
The results also show
 that relativism
 and no-truth m
ap onto one dim
en-
sion. From
 a purely philosophical perspective this m
ay seem
 a striking finding 
because relativism
 and no-truth seem
 logically inconsistent. That is, if there 
are no m
oral truths, then there are no relative m




 a psychological perspective this m
ay be less surprising. This is because 
relativism
 and no-truth both reject the existence of a single objective truth. 
H
ence, despite being philosophically distinct view
s, they consist of the sam
e 
psychological construct in light of rejecting the idea of a single objective 
m
orality. The relativism
 and no-truth item





orthy result is that universalism
 and absolutism




 and no-truth. In other w
ords, 
Independent Truth and Universal Truth seem




ents that are universally true w
ill be true sim
pliciter as w
ell as true inde-
pendently of particular cultures. Even so, w
hat is at stake in these tw
o dim
en-
sions differs in that denying the form
er is different from
 denying the latter: 
people’s beliefs about w
hether there are true m
oral judgm
ents are correlated 
w
ith, but independent from
, their judgm
ents about w
hether there are abso-
lute m
oral principles or w
hether m
oral judgm
ents are universally true. Yet ex-
isting research tacitly assum
ed that these view












aidt, Rosenberg, and H
om









, and so forth, underlie m
orality. The present research contributes 
to this by show
ing that each of these view
s exist on different psychological 
dim
ensions. 
12  There w
ere no cross-loadings betw
een different factors, w
hich suggest that the three factors are 
genuinely distinct. O







ilar for people to be able to distinguish them
. This is a possible lim
itation of this study and 
som
ething to be im
proved in future research.
Item
s expressing considerations related to relativism
 and no-truth com
pose 
the first factor. Because the item
s all loaded negatively on this factor, all of the 
item
s w
ere reverse-coded. As a consequence, high scores on the scale indi-
cate first, that there are m
oral truths and second, that they are independent 
of particular cultures. Because of this, I refer to this dim
ension as ‘Independ-
ent Truth’. This scale had a high level of internal consistency (Cronbach’s α 
= .90). The second scale contains item




hich is the view
 that m
orality is based on a divine entity. 
This dim
ension is called “D
ivine Truth”. The Cronbach’s alpha score of .93 in-









a scale labeled “Universal Truth”. This scale has a sim
ilarly high level of in-
ternal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .89). Participants w
ho score highly on this 
scale are m
ore likely to support the idea that there are absolute m
oral norm
s 
that have universal application. 
 
As allow
ed by the present analysis, and as is often the case for constructs 
in the social sciences, the factors correlate significantly.  The Universal Truth 
and Independent Truth factors correlated m
oderately to strongly, r(404) = .66, 
p < .001, the Universal Truth and D
ivine Truth scores correlated m
oderately, 
r(404) = .54, p < .001, and the Universal Truth and D
ivine Truth scores also 
correlated m
oderately, r(404) = .38, p < .001). 
4.2 D
iscussion
Study 1 presented participants w
ith item








 and no-truth.  The 
questions asked w
ere w
hether people distinguish these positions and along 
w
hich dim
ensions their intuitions about the status of m
oral judgm
ents are 





vine Truth as a separate dim
ension. Universalism
 and absolutism
 turned out  
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Four hundred ninety participants w
ere recruited via the online service M
e-








e set of item
s as presented in Study 
1. Participants w
ho did not com
plete the survey or failed to answ
er attention 
checks (N
 = 9) correctly w
ere excluded from
 statistical analyses. The attention 
checks consisted of an item
 in the m
iddle of the survey that instructed partic-
ipants to rem
em
ber the code w
ord “Rose” and to rate “strongly agree” to that 
item
. Participants w
ere requested to fill out this code in a box on a new
 screen 
at the end of the study. 
5.1.2 M
aterials and Procedure
Participants received 20 item
s in a random
 order and w
ere asked to rate the 
item
s on a six-point scale (1: Strongly disagree, 6: Strongly agree). The item
s 
consisted of statem
ents about the status of m
orality that w
ere developed on 
the basis of the five m
oral view















and theory) and “It is an illusion to think that 
anything is really m




. The results of the participants’ responses 
w
ere analyzed using confirm




atory factor analysis w
as conducted in R 3.2.3. w
ith the Lavaan 




ation to test the 
three-factor solution as found above. To exam
ine the three-factor m
odel as 




s load onto D
ivine Truth 
is not very surprising. H
ow
ever, theorists have often assum






. Indeed, Sarkissian and 
Phelan acknow
ledge this by w
riting in their abstract that “[s]om
e theorists 
contend that God is view
ed as a divine guarantor of right and w
rong, render-
ing m











 a psychological perspective, 
adherence to divine com
m







 (though they are correlated). 
 
In short, this study led to the developm
ent of a m
easurem





O). The results show
 that people’s intuitions about 
m
oral view




ivine Truth, and Universal Truth. The item
s of each of these dim
en-
sions form
 reliable subscales. These results show
 that m
oral view
s that are 
philosophically distinct do not have to be psychologically distinct. And they 
suggest that m




f course, the specific selection of item
-categories in this study m
ay have 
constrained the possibility of discovering additional latent dim
ensions. N
ev-
ertheless, the statistical results on the present scale provide indications for a 
valid m
easurem




 scale structure is confirm
ed by confirm
atory factor analysis. If 
those results yield negative outcom
es, I w
ill consider additional philosophi-
cal view
s that m
ay be part of folk m
oral objectivity.
5. Study 2: A confirm
atory factor analysis of the three-factor structure
The next question is w




atory factor analysis. Therefore, 
a separate data sam
ple w
as collected to test w
hether this is the case. Con-
firm
atory factor analysis is a structural equation m
odeling technique that al-
low
s one to test w
hether or not the shared variance of item
s can indeed be 
47
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w
hat it purports to m





To this end, I use the FM
O
-scale to replicate a previous study on perceived 
objectivity. Sarkissian et al. (2011) show








ho have different m
oral fram
ew
orks. The question I ask is w
hether the di-
m
ensions of the m
easurem
ent scale predict people’s ascriptions of objectivity 
in a m
oral disagreem
ent involving one party from
 the sam
e culture and one 
party from
 a different culture (the other-culture condition of Sarkissian et al. 
2011). In this study, this question w










o hundred five participants w
ere recruited via the online service M
echani-




 = 12.61). 
Participants w
ho had previously participated in studies that involved the de-
velopm
ent of the m
easurem
ent scale w
ere excluded. Participants w
ho did 
not com
plete the survey or failed to answ




 statistical analyses. The attention checks consisted of 
an item
 in the m




ord “Purple” and to rate “strongly agree” to that item
. Participants 
w
ere requested to fill out this code in a box on a new
 screen at the end of the 
study. Analyses w
ere conducted on the rem
aining 203 participants. The sam
-
ple size w
as based on an assessm
ent of how
 the num
ber of participants Sark-
issian et al. (2011) used. A post-hoc pow
er analysis using G*Pow
er 3.1 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner &
 Lang, 2009) for a linear m
ultiple regression design w
ith 
a sam
ple of 203 participants and an alpha of .05 indicated a statistical pow
er 
of 99%
 to detect an effect size of 0.25, w




 effect size (Cohen, 1988).
revealed by exploratory factor analysis, CFA w









R < .08), and the Root M




ended: RSEA <.08) w
ere inspected (Bentler, 1990; 
Brow
ne &
 Cudeck, 1993; H
u &
 Bentler, 1999). Results provided strong support 
for the three-factor m
odel and indicated that it w
as a good fit (CFI = .928; 
SRM
R = 0.053; RM
SEA = 0.076). Taken together w
ith the results of the explor-
atory factor analysis, w
e are m
ore certain that each of the subscales of Inde-
pendent Truth, D





 internally consistent subscales 
and that strongly discrim
inate betw
een each other. 
5.2 D
iscussion
The goal of Study 2 w
as to test w
hether the three-factor structure found by ex-
ploratory factor analysis in Study 1 w
ould be confirm
ed by conducting a con-
firm
atory factor analysis on a different data sam
ple. The results of the CFA 
support the three-factor structure found by EFA. The scale thereby fulfills the 
basic requirem
ents that w
e need for a proper scale: item
s w
ere developed in 
extensive brainstorm
 sessions, all item
s load strongly on a single factor, there 
are no cross-loadings, subscales have high reliability, and CFA conducted on 
a separate dataset confirm
 the three-factor structure found by EFA. The ques-
tion that I address next is how
 FM
O
 relates to perceived objectivity.
6. Study 3: First validation study




hether it captures per-
ceived objectivity. The scale w
as constructed to m
easure a w
ide range of in-
tuitions concerning m
oral objectivity that are closely related to but distinct 
from
 perceived objectivity. Study 1 revealed three dim
ensions that underlie 
people’s intuitions about m
oral objectivity. It m
ight be that they predict peo-
ple’s perceived objectivity ascriptions as found in previously conducted ex-
perim
ental studies. If successful, this w
ould confirm
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6.3 D
iscussion
This study reveals that the dim
ensions of the m
easurem
ent scale are each 
associated w
ith perceived objectivity. Independent Truth and Universal Truth 
are positively related to this construct. That is, those w
ho score highly on 
Independent Truth or Universal Truth tend to say that at least one of those 
involved in a m
oral disagreem
ent has to be w
rong. D
ivine Truth, in contrast, 
is negatively related to perceived objectivity.
 
The findings of this study validate the FM
O
-scale in that it successfully 
predicts perceived objectivity as m
easured by the other-culture condition of 
















ivine Truth and the other-culture variable w
hen controlling for Independ-
ent Truth and Universal Truth.  For som
eone w
ho adheres to divine com
m
and 
ethics, the results here suggest that the positive association betw
een D
ivine 
Truth and perceived objectivity results from
 an endorsem
ent of Independent 
Truth and/or Universal Truth. This relationship w




 a positive association betw
een grounding 
one’s m
orals in divine com
m




 that there is an association betw
een religious concepts and 
m
oral objectivity. M




ic faiths are m
ost likely to endorse m
oral objectivism
 and that it 
is specifically people’s beliefs in God’s punishing characteristics that predict 
m
oral objectivity. Those are interesting findings, but those studies did not dis-
tinguish betw
een Independent Truth, Universal Truth and D
ivine Truth. It is 
therefore possible that the relationship that w
as found betw
een religion and 
m
oral objectivity is m
erely correlational and disappears w
hen controlling for 
Independent Truth and Universal Truth. 
6.1.2 M
aterials and Procedure
Each participant received the m
easurem
ent scale and the other-culture con-
dition from
 Sarkissian et al. (2011, Experim
ent 1) in counterbalanced order. 
In the other-culture condition, the participants w
ere asked to im
agine an iso-
lated tribe of people called the M
am
ilons. They w
ere told that the M
am
ilon 
tribe lives in the Am
azon rainforests and has preserved a traditional w
arri-
or culture w
ith different values from
 people in the surrounding society. Fol-
low
ing this description, the participants received tw
o questions to m
easure 





transgressions. Both transgressions involved canonical m
oral violations; one 
concerned the killing of a young child and the other involved the random
 
stabbing of innocent passersby. The participants w
ere then told that one of 
their neighbors thought that this act w
as m
orally w





ilon society thought that the act w
as m
orally perm
issible. For each 




the sentence “Since your neighbor and the M
am
ilon have different judg-
m
ents about this case, at least one of them
 m
ust be w
rong.”  The participants 
w
ere asked to respond to this question on a scale of agreem
ent from















ent scale and the com
posite score of the other-culture judg-
m
ents w
ere calculated. The other-culture score positively correlated w
ith In-
dependent Truth, r(203) = .51, p <.001, Universal Truth, r(203) = .54, p <.001, 
and D
ivine Truth r(203) = .17, p  = .02.  Subsequently, the other-culture score 
w
as regressed on the three dim
ensions and results show
 that the three pre-
dictors explained 34.2%
 of the variance (R2= .342, F(3, 199) = 34.51, p <.001). 
Independent Truth (b = .45, t (3, 199) = 2.98, p = .01), Universal Truth (b =.79, 
t (3, 199) = 4.89, p <.001), and D
ivine Truth (b = -.20, t (3, 199) = -2.15, p = .03) 
predicted vignette scores. 
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7. Study 4: Second validation study
The aim
 of Study 3 w
as to further validate the m
easurem
ent scale by repli-
cating a previous study on perceived objectivity and interpersonal tolerance. 
Goodw
in and D
arley (2012) found that people w






istaken tend to be less tolerant 
tow
ard m
orally divergent others. In this study, I set out to replicate Good-
w
in and D




fortable a participant w





. Just as Study 2, this experim
ent can be used to check w
hether the 
dim




arley’s cases to test w




-scale – to w
it Independent Truth, Universal Truth, and D
ivine 
Truth – predict perceived objectivity. 
 
The m
ain goal of this study, how
ever, is to investigate w
hether the dim
en-
sions of the scale predict people’s tolerance tow
ard m
orally divergent others. 
There is reason to expect each of these dim
ensions to be predictive of intol-
erance. Those w
ho subm




e that they know
 w
hat is right and w
rong and m
ight be 
critical of those w
ho have m




er, this need not be the case. Belief that m
oral truths exist can be com
bined 
w
ith the belief that it is not alw
ays easy to know
 those truths. Even so, given 
the positive relation Goodw
in and D
arley found, I expect that at least Inde-
pendent Truth and Universal Truth are predictive of intolerance. The fact that 
D
ivine Truth turned out to be negatively correlated to perceived objectivity in 
Study 3 suggests that it is an exception.  
 
In this study I w
ill also investigate the differences betw
een perceived ob-
jectivity and the dim
ensions of the m
easurem
ent scale w
ith regard to toler-
ance. Goodw
in and D
arley’s study have show
n that perceived objectivity is 
associated w
ith tolerance. The previous study (Study 3) show
s that the dim
en-
sions of the m
easurem
ent scale are associated w
ith perceived objectivity. The 
question is then w
hat associations exist betw
een perceived objectivity, the 
dim
ensions of the m
easurem




ight be that people have different view
s on w
hether or not the com
m
ands 




ay respond as if m
orality is relative because they 
believe that the divine com
m
ands issued by God apply to their ow
n culture 
and not necessarily to m
em






bers of different cultures. Alternatively, it 
is possible that people recognize that other cultures have different gods and 
that those gods m
ay issue different com
m
ands. As a result, m
oral truth is 
relative to those different cultures. 
 
A yet different possibility is that an individual differences variable ex-
plains the specific relationship found here. The study show





itted to a divine com
m




ents as if only one person is correct. Thus, although they 
believe that m
oral truths are based on divine com
m
ands (as the scale item
s 
m
easure), they refrain from
 explicitly judging that others m
ust be m
istaken. 
The reason for this m
ay be that people w
ho are com
m




ay also be the kind of people that refrain from
 judging w
hat 
others should do or think. Indeed, they m















inded thinkers, they 
perhaps m
ay judge that a certain m
oral truth exists, but w
hen they are asked 
about this in a m
ore detached forum





ents. Alternatively, Saroglou (2011) proposes that there 
are four distinct dim
ensions of religion (believing, bonding, behaving, and 
belonging) that m
ay express them
selves differently in different cultures. It is 
possible that people’s view
 about w
hether or not the com
m
ands of a divine 
entity apply to other cultures depends on their psychological reliance on each 
of the dim
ensions identified by Saroglou (2011). Relatedly, the scores of indi-
viduals on D
ivine Truth m






eindl, Beall, Johnson &
 Zhang, 2016).  Consequently, 
there are a variety of possibilities to explain the effect here and this w
ould be 
an interesting question for future research. 
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behind on the table next to him
. H
e is able to look inside the w
allet discreetly, 
and finds $200 in cash. H
e takes the $200, and leaves the restaurant. Rate the ex-
tent to w
hich you agree w
ith the claim
 that Jason’s actions are m
orally w
rong. 
2. Punch. After a very diffi
cult day at w
ork, Frank goes to his local bar to 
w
atch his favorite team
. As soon as Frank sits dow





ents about Frank›s team










 off his bar stool. Rate the extent to w
hich you agree w
ith the 
claim
 that Frank’s actions are m
orally w
rong.
3. False alibi. O
ne of M








as doing on the night of the alleged m
urder. W
ithout having been asked, 
M
egan provides a false alibi to the police for her friend, claim




 on the night of the night of the alleged m
urder. Rate the extent to 
w
hich you agree w
ith the claim
 that M







 is out w
ith his friends one night and has been 
drinking. As they are w
alking hom






ers lain at the base of it. Tom
 w
ants to im
press his friends, 
and so he decides to vandalize the m
em
orial. H
e urinates on the m
em
orial 
and on the flow
ers. Rate the extent to w









ike is a professional sportsm
an. H
e is playing in a m
atch against 
a team
 that is know
n to have a large Jew
ish support-base, and these opposi-
tion supporters are heckling him
. H





ustache, and giving them
 a N
azi salute. Rate the ex-
tent to w
hich you agree w
ith the claim
 that M
ike’s actions are m
orally w
rong. 
ceived objectivity and/or the dim
ensions of the m
easurem
ent scale predict 
tolerance w




Three hundred fifty participants w
ere recruited via the online service 
M





= 12.17). Participants w
ho previously participated in studies that involved the 
developm
ent of the m
easurem
ent scale w
ere excluded. Participants w
ho did 
not com
plete the survey or failed to answ




 statistical analyses. The attention checks consisted of 
an item
 in the m





” and to rate “strongly agree” to that item
. Participants 
w
ere requested to fill out this code in a box on a new
 screen at the end of the 
study. Analyses w
ere conducted on the rem
aining 347 participants. A large 
sam
ple size w
as chosen in order to have suffi
cient statistical pow
er.  A post-
hoc pow
er analysis using G*Pow
er 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner &
 Lang, 2009) 
for a linear m
ultiple regression design w
ith a sam
ple of 339 participants and 
an alpha of .05 indicated a statistical pow
er of 100%
 to detect an effect size of 
0.25, w
hich is considered to be a sm
all to m
edium
 effect size (Cohen, 1988).
7.1.2 M
aterials and Procedure




easures of perceived 
objectivity and tolerance in a counterbalanced order. The m
easure of objec-
tivity and tolerance w
as the sam




ent 1). For the m
easure of objectivity and tolerance, each participant 
received six different scenarios involving m
oral issues, in a random
 order:
1. Steal w
allet. Jason is saving up for an iPod, but he is getting im
patient that it 
is taking so long to have enough m
oney. After he has finished dinner at a local 
restaurant one evening, he notices that another custom
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versal Truth, r(339) = -.21, p <.001, significantly correlated w
ith tolerance, but 
D
ivine Truth did not, r(339) =-.08, p = .163.
 
The next step w





ent scale, perceived objectivity and tolerance. To this end, I 
com
puted several linear m
ixed effect m









it possible to account for the cross-nestedness of observations in respondents 
and scenarios through the inclusion of random
 effects (e.g., Gelm
an and H
ill 
2007). In the first m
odel, the relationships betw
een Independent Truth, Uni-
versal Truth, and D
ivine Truth and the com
posite objectivity score w
ere in-
vestigated. The results in Table 2 show
 that Independent Truth and Universal 
Truth are both positively related to the com
posite objectivity score. The m
odel 
controls for age, gender, and nationality. Com





 scenario effects (results not show
n) reveals that the 
latter significantly im
proved m
odel fit (χ2 = 347.45, df = 1, p < .001). Figure 2 
depicts the estim
ated random
 scenario effects for the m











































otes.  Controlled for Age, Gender, and N
ationality
6. Burn flag. Am








unicate that to her students. She decides to do this by burning a U
S flag in 
front of them
. Rate the extent to w







The participants read each scenario and w
ere then asked to rate the extent 
to w
hich they agreed that the person’s actions w
ere m
orally w
rong on a six-
point scale (1: strongly disagree, 6: strongly agree). The participants w
ere 
then asked tw
o objectivity questions and a tolerance question. For the first 
objectivity question, the participants w
ere asked w
hether there w






as true (1: no correct answ
er, 6: defi-
nitely a correct answ




ould interpret a m
oral disagreem
ent w




either of us needs to be m
istaken, 6: The other person 
is clearly m
























oral objectivity by adding up the scores and dividing it by the num
-
ber of variables. Each participant w
as then given an objectivity score rep-
resenting the m
ean of the judgm
ent for the six m
oral transgressions. I also 
constructed a com
posite score of the tolerance variable for each of the six 
m
oral transgressions by adding up scores and dividing it by the num
ber of 
variables.  Subsequently, correlations betw
een the dim
ensions of the m
eas-
urem
ent scale and the com
posite score of perceived objectivity w
ere calcu-
lated. Independent Truth, r(338) =.37, p <.001, Universal Truth, r(338) =.42, 
p <.001, and D
ivine Truth, r(338) =.17, p <.001, each correlated significantly 
w
ith the com
posite objectivity score. Correlations w
ere also calculated for 
the tolerance m
easure. Independent Truth, r(339) =-.18, p = .001), and Uni-
57
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otes.  Controlled for Age, Gender, and N
ationality
The next step w
as to include the fixed effect of the com
posite objectivity score 
in the m
odel of Table 3. The results presented in Table 4 reveal that in this 
m
odel only the com
posite objectivity score is significantly related to toler-
ance. In contrast to the m
odel w
ithout perceived objectivity, the relationship 
w
ith Universal Truth is not statistically significant. W
hat these results indi-
cate is that the com
posite objectivity score is a m
ediator in the relationship 
betw
een Universal Truth and tolerance (see figure 4). As in the previous m
od-
els, com






s the latter im
prove m
odel fit significantly (χ2 = 19.94, df = 1, p < 
.001). Figure 3 show
s the estim
ated random
 scenario effects of the m
odel in 
Table 4.
Figure 2 Plot of random
 effects of scenarios for com
posite objectivity score
Subsequently, I exam
ined the relationship betw
een the dim
ensions of the 
m
easurem
ent scale and the tolerance variable. The results presented in Ta-
ble 3 show
 that Universal Truth is significantly related to tolerance w
hile In-
dependent Truth and D
ivine Truth are not, again controlling for age, gender, 
and nationality. Again, com





 scenario effects (results not show
n) show
s that these effects signifi-
cantly im
prove m
odel fit (χ2 = 138.59, df = 1, p < .001).
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Figure 4 Coeffi
cients for the relationship betw
een U







As in Study 3, Independent Truth, Universal Truth, and D
ivine Truth, are 
positively correlated to perceived objectivity. A m
ixed effects analysis show
s 




s that Universal 
Truth is negatively related to tolerance and that perceived objectivity is a m
e-




ent scale explain distinct variance in perceived objectivity and 





ing that the dim
ensions are not only related to per-







Just as in Study 3, results indicate that the relationship betw
een D
ivine 
Truth and perceived objectivity seem
s less straightforw
ard as results of pre-
vious research suggested (Goodw
in &
 D
arley 2008; Sarkissian &
 Phelan 2019; 
Yilm
az &
 Bahçekapili 2015). D
ivine Truth and perceived objectivity corre-
late positively but the relationship disappears w




posite objectivity  
score w










































otes.  Controlled for Age, Gender, and N
ationality
Figure 3 Plot of random
 effects of scenarios for tolerance
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lar relationships exist betw
een the dim
ensions of the m
easurem
ent scale and 
m
easures of behavioral intentions that are different than tolerance. 
8. Study 5: W
illingness to harm
 







. In Study 4 tolerance 
w
as m
easured as the degree to w








 as a long-term
 guest in their 
house. The aim
 of the present study is to determ
ine w
hether the relation that 
is found betw
een people’s attitudes tow
ards m
oral objectivity and intolerance 






As discussed above, research by Skitka and colleagues (Skitka et al. 2005) 
show







andates, decreases people’s tolerance, goodw





. In their research, they do not dis-
tinguish betw
een the view
s that underlie m
oral judgm
ents. The present re-
search investigates w
hether Independent Truth, Universal Truth, and D
ivine 
Truth have different relationships w
ith a behavioral intention m
easure that 
extends beyond tolerance. 
 
The general hypothesis is therefore that Independent Truth, Universal 
Truth, and D




 others. This study w












oral truth and falsity have relationships w
ith variables beyond 
tolerance. The tolerance variable used in Study 4 m
easures the degree of phys-
ical and social distance people desire from
 people w
ho have different m
oral 
convictions than they do. Tolerance is one specific response to people w
ho 
Universal Truth are taken into account. Given that a sim
ilar result w
as ob-
tained in Study 3, it seem
s that this relationship is genuine. Future research 
should investigate w
hether or not any of the explanations given in the discus-
sion of Study 3 explain this result. 
 
The results here also show
 that Universal Truth, w
hen controlling for 
Independent Truth and D
ivine Truth, decreases people’s tolerance of m
or-
ally divergent others. M
ore specifically, perceived objectivity is a m
ediator 
betw
een Universal Truth and tolerance. People’s com
m
itm
ents to Universal 
Truth are positively related to perceived objectivity w
hile perceived objectiv-
ity is negatively related to tolerance. This suggests that perceived objectivity 
w
orks as a m
echanism
 betw
een Universal Truth and tolerance. 
 
Skitka et al. (2005) show
 that the strong m
oral convictions that people 
have decrease their tolerance of those w
ho have different m
oral convictions. 
It increases people’s social and physical distance from
 others, and it decreas-
es their goodw
ill and cooperation to resolve conflicts. In their sem
inal paper, 
Skitka et al. (2005) explicitly assum
e that m
oral judgm
ents are perceived as 
being objective, universal, and absolute. The present studies suggest that spe-
cifically absolutism
 and universalism
 (represented here by Universal Truth) 
are associated w
ith tolerance. H




ents and that these can potential-
ly explain associations w
ith tolerance. The present research contributes by 
show
ing that Universal Truth is particularly associated w
ith tolerance. It is 
therefore possible that people’s scores on Universal Truth explain the re-
sults found by Skitka and colleagues. If this is correct, future research should 
distinguish betw
een the different view
s that underlie m
oral judgm
ents and 
hence at least take into account Independent Truth and Universal Truth.
 
In short, this study show
s that Independent Truth and Universal Truth 
explain distinct variance in perceived objectivity. M
oreover, it show
s that per-
ceived objectivity is a m
ediator in the relationship betw
een Universal Truth 
and tolerance. Previous research assum




ents and the present study contributes by show
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as involving a party violating a m
oral norm
 and a different party as having the 
option of responding harm
fully. Participants w
ere asked to indicate w
hether 
or not they w
ould favor a harm




ere used to predict w
hether people have a w
illingness to harm
 others 
but no specific direction w




Four hundred ninety-three participants w
ere recruited via the online service 
M





ho previously participated in studies that involved the develop-
m
ent of the M
M
S w
ere excluded. Participants w
ho did not com
plete the sur-
vey or failed to answ
er attention checks correctly (N
 = 12) w
ere excluded from
 
statistical analyses. The attention checks consisted of an item
 in the m
iddle of 
the survey that instructed participants to rem
em
ber the code w
ord “O
range” 
and to rate “strongly agree” to that item
. Participants w
ere requested to fill 
out this code in a box on a new
 screen at the end of the study.  Analyses w
ere 
conducted on the rem
aining 480 participants. I chose for a relatively high 
num
ber of participants for this study to be certain that there is suffi
cient sta-
tistical pow
er to detect a sm
all to m
edium
 effect size. Post-hoc pow
er analysis 
using G*Pow
er 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner &
 Lang, 2009) for a linear m
ul-
tiple regression design w
ith a sam
ple of 480 participants and an alpha of .05 
indicated a statistical pow
er of 100%
 to detect an effect size of 0.25, w
hich is 
considered to be a sm
all to m
edium
 effect size (Cohen, 1988).
8.1.2 M
aterials and procedure
Each participant received the m
easurem
ent scale and seven different scenari-












 0 (do not use violence) to 100 (use violence). For exam
ple, one 
scenario concerns the President of the United States deciding about w
hat to 
have different m
oral convictions. A different question pertains to how
 people 
respond to situations in w






s are ordinarily punished for their behavior. 
This punishm
ent can take place w
ith the aim
 of incapacitation or deterrence. 
People often experience m
oral outrage if they perceive others violating a 
m
oral norm
. If they decide to punish the offender they m
ay do this to inca-
pacitate further m
oves, they m
ay do this to deter people from
 violating those 
norm
s in the future, or they m
ay do this to signal to the offender w
hy he or 




itzer 2009). Regardless 
of m
otive, it m
ay be the case that people’s perception of m








For instance, if people adhere to Independent Truth, Universal Truth, or 
D
ivine Truth, they m










s irrespective of their scores on the dim
ensions of the 
m
easurem
ent scale. Alternatively, each of the dim
ensions m
ay be differently 
(i.e., positively and negatively) related to w
illingness to harm
.  Indeed, the 
perception that m
oral truth is universal and absolute, as represented by Uni-
versal Truth, m
ight induce people to respond in a resolute m





oral truth as absolute and universal 
m
ight entail a justification for setting other people straight. Alternatively, 
believing in the possibility of a single objective m




ithout believing that m
oral truth is absolute or 
universal, m
ight inhibit people to respond violently. This m





erely perceived as being led 
astray by m
istaken beliefs about the single objective truth and not as violating 
absolute or universal m
oral norm
s. A specific hypothesis here is therefore 
that Universal Truth increases w
hile Independent Truth decreases people’s 
w
illingness to punish norm
-violators.
 
In this study, participants received the m
easurem
ent scale and seven dif-
ferent scenarios in counterbalanced order. Each of the scenarios is described 
65
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5. Football. Som
e people are playing football. A few
 people on the sideline 
start shouting racial slurs at the black players and they even throw
 bananas 
on the field. M
ost of the players on the field believe that this is the w
rong 
w
ay to treat people and are thinking about violently throw
ing them
 out of the 
stadium
.
6. Christians. A group of Christians is holding a public prayer session in a 
park. They are unexpectedly interrupted by a person w
ho ridicules the Chris-
tian faith by shouting loud and disrespectful rem
arks about the bible in order 
to offend them
 and interrupt their prayer. A jogger in the park w
ho happens 
to run by is offended and thinks about pushing the person into the fishpond.
7. Veterans. At the end of Veterans D
ay, a group of veterans has com
e to a 
restaurant to have dinner together. W
hile the veterans are having dinner, tw
o 
other guests in the restaurant start m
ocking the veterans and m
ake insulting 
rem




orse, they even use a 
t-shirt w
ith the Am
erican flag to clean one of the dishes. The veterans are 
thinking of inviting these people to a fight outside to teach them
 a lesson.
8.2 Results
The scores on the w
illingness to harm
 m
easure for each of the seven scenar-
ios w
ere com











ensions of the FM
O






ere calculated. Independent 
Truth, r(480) = -.118, p <.001, and Universal Truth, r(480)=.102, p <.001, 
dim





ivine Truth, r(480)=.02, p= .653, did not.
The next step w
as to investigate the relationship betw
een the dim
ensions of the 
m
easurem
ent scale and w
illingness to harm
. To investigate these relationships, 
do to stop a violent terrorist group. The President is described as considering 
using force and bom
bing the terrorist group to stop them
. A different sce-
nario describes a gay couple in a restaurant m
inding their ow
n business and 
then suddenly being targeted by tw
o bullies w
ho verbally harass them
 about 





”) to 100 (“Bom
b them





”) to 100 (“Pull them
 off the barstool”). The full set 
of 7 scenarios:
1. President. The president of the United States is deciding about w
hat to do 
to stop a terrorist group. The terrorist group has recently com
m
itted terri-
fying brutalities to innocent people and the President of the United States is 
horrified by this.  H
e is considering to use force and bom
b them
.




ness but then w
ere suddenly targeted by tw
o bullies w




ise verbally harassing them
 about their sexu-
al orientation. Tw
o onlookers, at the other end of the bar, are appalled by 
the w
ay that these bullies are treating the gay couple. They are thinking of 
teaching the bullies a lesson by pulling them
 violently off their bar stools. 
3. Dog. Jason is w
alking his dog and observes another dog ow
ner hitting his 
dog w
ith a belt. The dog is clearly in pain and w
him









4. College. Jack, a senior in college, and Jessica, a freshm
an, are siblings and 
both in the sam
e college. Jessica has told Jack that she w
as sexually harassed 
by one of her m
ale classm
ates. Jack is considering visiting the classm
ate and 
setting him
 straight by putting him
 in an arm
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Figure 5 Plot of random




I hypothesized that Independent Truth and Universal Truth can be differently 
related to w
illingness to harm
. That is, perceiving m
oral truth to be absolute 
and universal m
ay induce people to respond resolutely to violations of m
oral 
norm
s. Additionally, believing that there is a single objective truth (rejecting 
m
oral relativism






ay inhibit people to respond violently. The results of this study 
show
 that Universal Truth and Independent Truth are indeed differently re-
lated to w
illingness to harm
, respectively positively and negatively. 
 
The results of this study are im
portant for a variety of reasons. First, 




plies that Independent Truth and Universal 
Truth are psychologically distinct dim
ensions, w
hich further validates the 
FM
O
 scale. Second, the fact that Independent Truth and Universal Truth 






ensions fulfil distinct psychological roles. Third, these results 
I conducted a linear m
ixed effect analysis in R 3.2.3 using the lm
e4 package.  
The results presented in Table 5 show
 that controlling for age, gender, and na-















 scenario effects, revealing significant effects of the latter (χ2 = 504.69, 
df = 1, p < .001). Figure 5 depicts the estim
ated random
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roles. W




 others, those w
ho score highly on Independent 
Truth express less w
illingness to harm
 others. 
9.1 Relationship to previous research on perceived objectivity
O
ne of the novelties of the present research w
as to investigate w
hether peo-






ensional, as research concerning perceived objectivity (Good-
w
in and D









 Grandjean 2014), and research on m




; Skitka et al. 2005) has thus far assum
ed. People’s re-
sponses to a range of distinct view
s w
ere tested and the question arose 
w
hether these conceptually distinct view
s are also psychologically distinct. 
The studies reveal that they do not directly m
ap onto how
 people think about 
m
orality. As it turns out, relativism
 and no-truth form













hat do these results teach us about how
 
people think about m
orality? 
 
The crucial finding is that people conceive of the objectivity of m
oral 
judgm
ents in different w
ays. There are som
e w
ho take m




ents are true independently of particular groups or 
cultures. There are others w
ho take it to im
ply that m
oral judgm
ents are true 
because they are based on universal and absolute m
oral norm
s, and yet oth-
ers because m
oral judgm
ents depend on divine com
m
ands. Each of the di-
m
ensions of Independent Truth, Universal Truth, and D
ivine Truth fulfills a 







as established relying on previous research con-
cerning perceived objectivity and its relation to tolerance. At the sam
e tim
e, 
the studies reveal that perceived objectivity is only one aspect of folk m
oral 
objectivity. A substantial am
ount of the variance in m
oral thinking can be 
provide a novel perspective on research on strong m
oral attitudes and their 
relationship w
ith different types of intolerance (e.g. Skitka et al. 2005). It is 
possible that exam
ining people’s strong m
oral attitudes, w
hile controlling for 





Five studies suggest that folk m




enon. The results of these studies provide new
 insights into how
 people 
think about the objectivity of m
orality, and they provide a novel tool for m
eas-






oral objectivity can be m
easured on distinct dim
en-
sions. People’s responses to tw
enty item
s from
 five different categories (rep-








hat I call ‘no truth’) revealed three distinct 
psychological constructs. The dim









ents belong.  People w
ho endorse this 
dim
ension reject the idea that there are no m
oral truths or that m
oral truth is 
relative and hence share the idea that there is a single objective truth. The di-
m
ension of Universal Truth represents the view
 that there are absolute m
oral 
norm






orally true or false depends on the existence 
of a divine entity and that m
oral know
ledge is revealed in divine books and 
religious texts. 
 
Studies 2 and 3 show
 that Independent Truth and Universal Truth, but 
not D
ivine Truth, are positively related to perceived objectivity. Studies 3 
and 4 also reveal a negative relationship betw
een Universal Truth and inter-
personal tolerance. Study 4 show
s that the dim
ensions of Universal Truth 
and Independent Truth pull people’s w
illingness to harm
 others in different  
directions, w
hich indicates that these dim
ensions plays distinct psychological 
71
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further research is w
hy this holds and w




9.2 Relation to other research in social psychology
Above I rem





akes a variety of assum
ptions that are rel-





oral rules and violations to other social contexts w
hile 
conventional rules and violations are perceived as applying locally (Turiel, 
1983, 1998; Sm
etana, 1981, 1983; Sm
etana and Braeges, 1990). There is also 
research that show
s that people are least supportive of m
oral diversity com
-




 2003). Additionally, 
in research by Skitka and colleagues (e.g. Skitka et al. 2005) it is assum
ed that 
m
oral issues are perceived as objective, absolute, and universal, and their 
research show
s that strong m
oral convictions, com
pared to strong non-m
oral 
attitudes, explains unique variance in interpersonal tolerance. The present 
research suggests that w








s that it is specifically Universal truth that predicts interpersonal tol-
erance, Study 5 show
s that Independent Truth and Universal Truth even pull 





Future research on m
oral attitudes and m
oral behavior m
ight be advanced by 




easures folk attitudes tow
ards m
oral truth in term
s of 
perceived objectivity. The findings presented here show
 that people have 
m
ore fine-grained intuitions about m
oral objectivity. They can be captured 
in term
s of three constructs, to w
it Independent Truth, Universal Truth and 
D
ivine Truth. Each of these constructs is differently related to perceived 





s of Independent Truth, Universal Truth and D
ivine Truth, 
w




Studies 2 and 3 reveal that perceived objectivity scores require careful in-
terpretation. Above I considered w
hat high scores on perceived objectivity 
m
ight m
ean. It is also w
orthw
hile to explicate how
 low
 scores could be inter-
preted. People w
ho do not perceive m
orality as objective m
ight conceive of 
m
oral truth as being relative, or not believe in m
oral truths at all (if they score 
low
 on the dim
ension of Independent Truth). Alternatively, they m
ight reject 
the idea of absolute m
oral norm
s that are universally binding (if they score 
low
 on Universal Truth). Finally, they m
ight deny that there are true m
or-
al judgm
ents that are based on divine com
m
andm
ents. The present results 
also shed a new
 light on research that show








Sarkissian and Phelan 2019; Yilm
az &
 Bahçekapili 2015). Studies 2 and 3 rep-
licate this finding in that D




ever, this relationship disappears w
hen other dim
ensions are 
taken into account. As it turns out, religious grounding itself does not im
pli-
cate an increase in perceived objectivity. 
 
Finally, studies 4 and 5 reveal interesting correlations betw
een the three 
dim
ensions on the one hand and tolerance and w
illingness to harm
 on the 
other. Study 3 show
s that, rather than m
oral objectivity in general, scores on 
Universal Truth in particular are correlated w
ith how
 com





s as a long-term
 guest. Study 5 
show




others. The study show
s that high scores on Independent Truth strongly de-
crease people’s w
illingness to harm
 others. This reveals that it can m
ake a 
difference for w
hich reasons people subscribe to m
oral objectivity. It is not 
the case that folk attitudes tow
ard m
oral truth as such explain w
illingness to 
harm
. Instead, one kind of m
oral objectivity is positively associated w
ith it, 
w
hereas another is negatively associated w
ith it. An im
portant question for 
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oral attitudes. Existing experim
ental research in experim
ental 
philosophy and social psychology tacitly assum




, the rejection of relativism
, or the idea that 
there are no m
oral truths, all exist on a single dim
ension. The present re-
search show
s that those view
s do not exist on a single dim
ension and that they 
do not function as a psychological conjoint, reinforcing each other. Rather, 
they play different psychological roles and they are different related to per-
ceived objectivity, tolerance, and people’s w




s. In addition to providing new





 scale, for conducting experi-
m
ental research to folk m
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any philosophers think that people are m
oral objectivists (Cuneo 2007; En-
och 2014, Joyce 2006; M
ackie 1977; Sm
ith 1994). Yet, existing research sug-
gests that they are in fact divided on this issue. There are large differences 
in objectivity ascriptions both betw





















hite 2013). And Sarkissian et al. (2011) show








hether people’s responses fit a m
ultitude of realist and 
antirealist view





ever, that existing studies do not m
easure people’s real 
allegiances. A first reason is that existing studies on folk m
etaethics have suf-
fered from




used did not alw






endations that Pölzler (2018) provides are really helpful in im
proving 
research on folk m
etaethics but there m
ay be yet a larger issue that he did 
not account for. That is, m
ost psychological studies asked questions that w
ere 
m
ore or less of an explicit m
etaethical nature. The nature of those questions 
m
ay have prom
pted people to provide explicit m
etaethical beliefs and/or to 
theoretically speculate about the nature of m
orality. Yet, philosophers do not 
base the assum
ption that people are m
oral objectivists on explicit m
etaethi-
cal beliefs or theoretical speculations but on com
m
itm









y appeal to com
m
onsense m
oral thinking is not a prediction about 




y concern is w
ith the philosophical im
plications or presuppositions of 
m















e that people are m




ever, that people som
etim
es explicitly deny m
oral objectivism
 
and verbally report that m




oreover, recent psychological research show
s large var-
iation in folk m
oral objectivity. Contrary to w
hat philosophers assum
e, it is 
therefore possible that people are not m
oral objectivists after all. That 
depends, how
ever, on the question of w
hether existing psychological re-
search m
easures the relevant com
m
itm
ents. In this paper, I argue that there 
are at least tw
o w
ays in w










itted to it. Enoch (2014) presents three tests 
to convince his reader that they are m
oral objectivists even if they explicit-
ly think otherw
ise. As it happens, Enoch’s tests, w
hich he uses as intuition 
pum







this paper I therefore use them
 as m
aterial for a survey study to test w
heth-
er people are im
plicit m
oral objectivists. Results show
 that a significant m
a-
jority of people is inclined tow
ard m
oral objectivism
 and a m
inority is not. 




 and the 
large variation found in som
e psychological studies, philosophers m
ight be 
correct that m
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Existing psychological studies m
ay have m
ostly m









 after all. To w
it, existing studies ask participants 
w
hether or not particular m
oral claim
s can be true or false (‘truth-aptness 
task’) and/or w






rong or that both can be correct (‘disagreem
ent task’). 
The m
etaethical nature of these questions m
ay have induced people to engage 
in explicit theorizing about the status of m
orality. M
oreover, the fact that they 
are asked to evaluate a range of m
oral and non-m
oral sentences as part of their 
participation in those studies increases the likelihood that they actively spec-
ulate about the answ
ers to these questions. Indeed, it decreases the likelihood 
that they provide answ






I do not claim
 that existing studies solely m




ents or that they lacked in sophistication. Indeed, existing studies used 
sophisticated m
easures and it is possible that those m









e cannot rule out that 
the findings of existing studies reflect people’s explicit com
m
itm
ents to such an 
extent that, if people are im
plicit m
oral objectivists, w
e fail to observe that this 




ittingly respond as m
oral objectivists. 
 
In order to determ
ine w





ents should be elicited. If it is true that people are m
oral objectivists, w
e 
should observe in m
easurem






people are inclined tow
ard m
oral objectivism
. Fortunately, Enoch has devel-
oped three intuition pum
ps that are developed to show
 that people are m
oral 
objectivists even if they explicitly deny this. In this paper, I present the results 
of a survey experim
ent that features these three tests.
 1.1 Enoch’s Tests
M




ents” is based on the descriptions pro-
vided above (e.g. Brink 1989, Björnsson 2012, Enoch 2014). It seem
s plausible 
and deliberation and that reflection on the nature of m
oral theorizing 
seem
s to support a realist view
 about these m
oral facts and truths. This 
claim
 m
ay be false, but this is not show




thical beliefs (or the lack thereof). (Brink 1989, p. 25)
In a later passage, Brink (1989, p. 51) literally refers to “[t]he objectivism
 or 
realism







Björnsson (2012, p. 9) draw




enting on and being engaged in m
oral thinking and debate. H
e goes on 
to argue that “the prim
ary task of m
etaethical theories is to account for this 
engaged behavior, rather than for w
hat is in effect lay people’s theoretical 
interpretations of it.” (ibid.: 9) This suggests that explicit beliefs need not be a 







ilarly, Enoch (2005, p. 773, footnote 31) w
rites that:
[W
]hat is relevant is not the explicit m
etanorm





ents – of participants in norm
ative 
discourse. W









ative discourse and 
practice them
selves. The fact that m
any sophom
ores (and not only them
) 
express som
e subjectivist or relativist m
etanorm
ative intuitions thus has 
very little w





The point can also be m
ade in term
s of Enoch’s (2014) distinction betw
een 
w
hat people explicitly think or say versus w




to. Enoch argues that explicit com
m
itm







e goes as far as claim
ing: ‘You m
ay think that you’re a m
oral rel-
ativist or subjectivist – m
any people today seem
 to. But I don’t think you are’ 
(Enoch, 2014, p. 193). 
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W
hat m
akes this joke funny, according to Enoch, is that the child fails to re-
alize that yuckiness is a subjective property. Given that he im
agines that his 
likes and dislikes change, he should adjust his judgm
ent about the taste of 
spinach. But he does not do this. In other w
ords, the child m
isconstrues yuck-
iness as being independent of his likes and dislikes. The child treats yucki-
ness as an objective property w
hile w
e, as the reader, are inclined to treat it as 
a subjective property. That is w









 to be m
ore objective than taste. To m
ake his point, Enoch 
presents a story about factual m
atters that has the sam
e structure:
[FACTUAL]  Consider, for instance, som
eone w
ho grew




ho believes that the earth revolves around the 
sun. Also, she reports to be happy that she w
asn’t born in the M
iddle Ages, 
“because had I grow
n up in the M
iddle Ages, I w
ould have believed that 
the earth is in the center of the universe, and that belief is false!” (Enoch, 
2014, p. 193-194)
Clearly, this version of the joke does not w
ork. The reasoning of this person 
sounds perfectly sensible w
hile the reasoning of the child does not. Enoch 
explains:
[i]f the joke w
orks, this seem
s to indicate that the subject m
atter is all 
about us and our responses, our likings and dislikings, our preferences 
and so on. If the joke doesn’t w




 objective than that, as in the astronom
y case. (Enoch, 2014, p. 193-194)
Given that w
e are interested in m
orality, the question then arises w
heth-
er m
oral versions of the joke m
ore closely resem
ble taste (and hence, are 
deem
ed to be about subjective m
atters) or [factual] (and hence, are deem
ed to 
be m
ore objective). Enoch thinks that w
e, philosophers and lay people alike, 
that there is a distinction betw
een w
hat people theoretically believe is the 
case, once they consider things explicitly, and w





hen engaged in m
oral language and thought. I w
ill therefore 
follow

















The goal of Enoch’s tests is to m
ake the reader realize that s/he is a m
oral 
objectivist, even if s/he explicitly denies being one. In other w
ords, they serve 




ents. Enoch presents them
 as thought 
experim
ents or intuition pum




uli it should take only a m
om
ent of reflection for people to 
realize that they im
plicitly accept the objectivity of m
orality. O
r, at least, that 




ith Enoch’s tests, indeed respond in a w
ay that show
s that they are m
or-
al objectivists? This question is im






a facie support for the truth 
of m
oral objectivism




the question is im
portant because existing psychological research show
s a 
large variety in objectivity ascriptions both betw
een individuals and betw
een 
different m




ents, as presented here, 
m
ay provide different results. In order to answ
er this question, I use Enoch’s 











2.1 Test 1: Jokes
Consider the follow
ing joke: 
[TASTE]  A child hates spinach. H
e then responds that he’s glad he hates 
spinach. To the question “W
hy?” he responds: “Because if I liked it, I 
w
ould have eaten it; and it’s yucky! (Enoch, 2014, p. 193) 
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2.3. Test 3: The counterfactual question
Enoch’s third test concerns counterfactuals. The key question is: “H
ad our 
beliefs and practices been very different, w
ould it still have been true that 






less and did not ban sm
oking, w
ould it still 
have been true that sm






atively. Enoch suggests that this is the case because w
e believe that it is an 
objective fact that sm










ination is ok, w




ould also say “Yes” in this case. Enoch thinks that w
e treat 
our m
oral beliefs as objective facts, and m
oral truth as independent from
 our 
beliefs and practices, and therefore the answ
er m
ust be “Yes”. 
 





s plausible. If people are indeed m
oral objectivists, the test 
should show
 that this is the case. Im
portantly, the tests do not concern peo-
ple’s beliefs about m
orality. Instead, their answ
ers are m





ents about it. For instance, if you do not think that [m
oral] 
is funny, then, Enoch proposes, you m
ust at som
e level regard m
orality as 
m
ore objective than taste. The sam






ent, and if you take w
hat 
is w
rong to be invariant w
ith respect to our beliefs. If you are a m
oral 
objectivist, in an im




hen used as intuition pum
ps, these tests are of lim
ited value. It 
can hardly be taken for granted that the responses of a particular individual 
generalize. Because of this, there is am
ple reason to put this to the test in the 
form




In order to test w






, I used Enoch’s tests of m












atters of taste. To pum
p this intuition, Enoch provides 
a third version of the joke:
[M
ORAL]  Suppose som
eone grew
 up in the U
S in the late tw
entieth centu-





e then reports that 
he’s happy that that’s w
hen and w
here he grew
 up, because “had I grow
n 
up in the 18th century, I w
ould have accepted slavery and racism
. And 
these things are w
rong!” (Enoch, 2014, p. 194)
As w
ith the factual case, this sounds perfectly sensible and the joke is clearly 
not funny. Enoch believes that this is best explained by the fact that w
e tend 
to ascribe objectivity to m
orality. 
2.2. Test 2: The phenom
enology of disagreem
ent




hat it feels like from
 the inside w
hen people have a differ-
ence of opinion. Enoch claim
s that different types of disagreem
ents have a 
different feel. W
hen people disagree about w
hether hum
an actions influence 
global w
arm
ing, this feels like trying to get an objective fact right. In contrast, 
a disagreem
ent about w
hether bitter chocolate tastes better than m
ilk choc-
olate feels like stating one’s ow







ore like a disagree-
m
ent about w
hether bitter chocolate tastes better than m








actions influence global w
arm





ilar to a disagreem




the one about bitter chocolate. The explanation that Enoch provides for this 
is that a m
oral disagreem
ent feels m
ore like a m
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actions are still w
rong w
hen beliefs and practices change. In the final part, par-
ticipants answ
ered three dem
ographics questions (age, gender, nationality).
3.1.2. M
aterials and Procedure
The study consisted of three different parts. In the first part, participants re-
ceived the three different versions of the Enoch jokes (taste, factual, m
oral) 
in a random
 order. In each case, they w
ere asked to answ
er tw
o questions 





ents: (1) “Can the above story 
be regarded as a joke?” (Yes, N
o); (2) “To w
hat extent do you think the above 
story is funny?” (0-100).
 
In the second part, participants read a very short story based on Enoch’s 
explanation about the difference betw
een disagreem
ents about taste and dis-
agreem
ents about factual m
atters (Enoch 2014, p. 195-196). Participants w
ere 
subsequently asked to think about a m
oral disagreem
ent about abortion or 
a disagreem
ent about a different m
oral issue they felt strongly about. They 
w
ere then presented w






ore like a disagreem
ent about w
hether bitter chocolate 
tastes better than m
ilk chocolate or w
hether it feels m








see Appendix 3). 




ould still cause cancer had our beliefs and practices 
changed (Enoch 2014, p. 196-197). They w
ere subsequently introduced w
ith 
a counterfactual of the form
 “H
ad our beliefs and practices been very differ-
ent, w




ination (or a different m
oral issue they feel strongly about) 
w
ould still be w
rong had our relevant practices and beliefs been different (for 
m
aterials, see Appendix 4).




ing each story, w
ere asked to indicate w
hether the story 
could be perceived as a joke and to rate the degree to w
hich they believed 
the story w
as funny. Secondly, participants w





o they feel m
ore like disagreem
ents about bitter 
chocolate versus m
















ould still be m
orally w
rong had our beliefs and practices been different. To 
be certain that participants’ read the instructions carefully and understood 
the questions, they w
ere also presented w
ith tw
o checks to test w
hether they 
interpreted the questions in the w
ay required. Taken together, the results of 
this experim
ent should provide us w
ith insight into the question of w
hether 
or not people are m





150 participants living in the United States w
ere recruited via the online ser-
vice M





ho did not com
plete the survey and a few
 w




ultiple-choice questions that assessed w
hether they under-
stood the second and third test appropriately and those participants w
ere ex-
cluded from
 statistical analyses. 13 Analyses w
ere conducted on the rem
aining 
97 participants (45 fem
ale; M
age= 37). The checks follow




ents feel and the question w
hether or not  
13  M
ore inform
ation on the attention checks can be found in A
ppendix 1 at the end of the paper. There 
w
ere no differences in results betw
een participants w
ho com
pleted the survey and answ
ered the 
attention checks correctly and participants w
ho com
pleted the survey but failed on the attention checks. 
M
oreover, I have conducted this exact survey experim
ent tw
ice on tw
o different data sam
ples. The 
fi
rst study did not contain attention checks and, to be certain of valid results (i.e. P
ölzler, 2018), I 
therefore conducted the sam
e study a second tim
e including attention checks (four m
onths after the fi
rst 
data collection). In A
ppendix 2, I provide the results of the data that I collected for the study w
ithout 
attention checks. The fact that the results of both survey experim
ents are very sim
ilar suggests that the 
effects found here are fairly robust.  
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Because of the w
ithin-subjects design of the present study and the non-nor-
m
al distribution of scores, a non-param




as conducted to test for differences in perceptions of how
 funny the 
joke is. The results indicate that the taste story w
as perceived as funnier 
(m
ean rank = 44.36) than the factual story (Z (94) = -3.551, p < .001). Results 
also show
 that the taste story w
as perceived as funnier (m
ean rank = 44.29) 
than the m
oral version (Z (94) = -6.676, p < .001). The factual story w
as also 
perceived as funnier (m
ean rank = 37.47) than the m
oral story (Z (94) = -5.531, 
p < .001).




Figure 3. Proportions for the question about the counterfactual “H
ad our 





ean Proportions and 95%
 confidence interval for the question 














een the Taste, Factual, and M
oral categories
Table 1 presents the percentages of “Yes” responses for each of the versions 
of the jokes and the upper and low
er boundaries of the 95%
 confidence in-
terval. Figure 1 show
s that the 95%
 confidence intervals do not overlap and 
hence that the differences betw
een each condition are significant. O
n the ba-
sis of the 95%
 confidence intervals, w
e can estim
ate the population m
ean for 
the proportion of “Yes” responses for the question of w
hether the taste story 
can be regarded as a joke. This lies betw
een 54.34%
 and 73.46%
. For the fac-




, and for the 
m
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2.2. D
iscussion
Results of the experim
ent show
 that m





ith regard to the first test, people perceive the taste 




perceive the taste story as funnier than the factual or m
oral story. According-
ly, the first test suggests that people treat yuckiness as a subjective property 
and m
oral and factual m
atters as involving non-subjective properties. Inter-
estingly, the difference betw
een the factual story and the m
oral story is sta-
tistically significant. This suggests that people treat factual and m
oral stories 
differently. It is possible, how
ever, that participants exaggerated a bit because 




 that for a m




ore like factual disagreem
ents than like disagreem
ents about taste. 
Follow




ore about getting an objective fact right than about stat-
ing one’s ow
n preferences. Sim
ilarly, the third test show
s that a m
ajority of 
people believes that m
oral w
rongness is fixed over different counterfactual 
circum
stances. That is, had their beliefs and practices been different, they 
w





sults provide support for Enoch’s thesis that people are m
oral objectivists. 
 
In light of recent studies providing m




arley 2008; 2012; W
right et al. 2013), 
or that appear to show
 that people are dow
nright antirealists (Pölzler and 
W
right, unpublished), this study represents a departure from
 that pattern. 
The m
ain difference w
ith previous studies is that the present research delib-






The different pattern observed here supports the idea that it m
akes sense 
to distinguish betw





research on folk m
oral objectivity m









ents, or results m
ay have been 
conflated by reflecting both im






ere conducted both for the question about how
 a disagree-
m
ent feels and for the question about the counterfactual of the form
 “H
ad our 
beliefs and practices been different, w
ould it still have been w
rong that so-
and-so?” (see figure 2 and 3). For the disagreem




ther”. These participants indicated that m
oral 
disagreem
ents do not feel like disagreem
ents about taste nor like factual dis-
agreem
ents. For exam
ple, one participant rem
arked, “It feels different. M
oral 
issues are not a m
atter of taste nor an objective truth”. Another participant 
rem
arked, “I think it’s a little bit of both. There are som
e objective truths to 
m
orality but also som
e subjective opinions”. Proportions w
ere calculated for 
the rem
aining participants (N
 = 93). O




ents feel like disagreem
ents about m
atters of taste and 
77.5%
 that they feel like factual disagreem
ents.
 
For each question a proportion test w
as conducted w
ith the null hypoth-
esis that the proportion is 0.5 versus the alternative hypothesis that the true 
population proportion is higher than 0.5. For the disagreem
ent question, re-
sults show
 that the null hypothesis is rejected (Z (93) = 5.41, p < .001). This im
-
plies that participants w
ere significantly m










For the counterfactual question, a proportion test sim
ilarly show
ed that 




of participants indicated that a m
oral disagreem
ent feels like a disagreem
ent 
about taste and 29.9%
 of participants indicated that had our beliefs and prac-
tices been different then abortion (or a different m
oral issue they felt strongly 
about) w
ould not be m
orally w
rong. After com
bining the proportions of the 
disagreem
ent and counterfactual test, it turns out that at m
ost 57.7%
 of par-
ticipants provide objective responses. 
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prehension questions that w
e w
ould like you to 
answ
er.
In part II of this survey w
e asked you about how
 it feels for you to engage in a certain 
kind of disagreem
ent. Please select one of the questions below






ing at in part II.







ore like a disagreem
ent about subjective prefer-
ences or m
ore like a disagreem
ent about getting the objective facts right?
[3] A
re disagreem
ents about chocolate the sam
e as disagreem




[4] I do not know
.
In part III of this survey w
e asked you a question w
hether gender-based discrim
ination 
(or a different exam
ple, if you think it is perm
issible) w
ould still be w
rong if our rele-




 of that question?
[1] To fi
nd out w






hether you believe that sm
oking still causes cancer if our relevant 












oking causes cancer” about objective m
atter of fact.
[4] I do not know
.
objectivity that philosophers assum
e to be characteristic of ordinary m
oral 
discourse and practices is m
uch m
ore im
plicit. If so, these philosophers m
ay 
have been right after all 14.
 
Taking into consideration the distinct pattern of responses found here 
com
pared to previous research, it m
ay be helpful for future psychological re-
search to distinguish betw
een im






ho believe that people are (either im
plicitly or explicitly) 
m






testing, the general recom
m






selves in ordinary m




endation is to m
ake clear w







ore evidence, the findings 
here do not conclusively show





ever, the results do point in that direction.
4. Conclusion
I have presented a survey study concerning the question w
hether people are 
m






oral objectivity. The study reveals that a signifi-
cant m
ajority of people regards m
orality as m
ore objective than taste and as 
sim
ilar to m
atters of fact. I therefore subm
it that, in spite of existing research 
suggesting that people m
ay be m
etaethical pluralists or m
etaethical antireal-
ists, this study provides som
e support for the idea that people m
ight be m
oral 
objectivists after all. That is, im
plicitly.
14  W
hat should be noted is that there is a sizable m




ne possibility is that FM
O
 appeals to som
e people but not all. A
 different 
possibility is that the tests developed by Enoch m




another possibility is that there are large differences in m
etaethical intuitions betw
een different 
individuals and that som
e exam
ples elicit objectivist intuitions in som
e individuals but not in others. 
W
e can only fi
nd an answ
er to this question by testing these possibilities in future research. A
t this 
tim
e, I interpret the fi
nding that a signifi
cant m
ajority of people respond as suggested by E
noch as 
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Proportion tests w
ere conducted both for the question about how
 a disagree-
m
ent feels and for the question about counterfactual reasoning. For the for-
m
er question, a proportion test w
as conducted w
ith the null hypothesis that 
the proportion is 0.5 versus the alternative hypothesis that the true popula-
tion proportion is higher than 0.5. The results show
 that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected (Z (97) = 3.92, p < .001). This im
plies that participants w
ere 
m
ore inclined to answ
er that m
oral disagreem
ents feel like factual disagree-
m
ents. For the question about counterfactual reasoning, a proportion test 
sim
ilarly show
ed that the null hypothesis can be rejected (Z (97) = 3.50972, 
p < .001).  At the sam
e tim
e, 26.6%
 of participants indicated that a m
oral dis-
agreem
ent feels like a disagreem
ent about taste and 30.9%
 of participants 
indicated that had our beliefs and practices been different, then abortion (or 
a different m
oral issue they felt strongly about) w
ould not be m
orally w
rong. 
Taken together (i.e. com
bining scores of the phenom
enology of disagree-
m
ent test and the counterfactual test), 53.6%
 of participants responded that 
m
oral disagreem
ents feel like disagreem
ents about global w
arm
ing and that 
m
oral issues w
ould not be w
rong had beliefs and practices been different. 
Appendix 2: Results first survey experim
ent (see footnote 1)
Table 1 M
ean proportions and 95%
 confidence interval for the question 












Table 1 presents the percentages of “Yes” responses for each of the versions 
of the jokes and the upper and low
er boundaries of the 95%
 confidence inter-
val for the first survey experim
ent (w
ithout attention checks). These results 
show
 that the spinach version is perceived considerably m
ore often as a joke 
than the science and m
oral versions. The population proportion of  “Yes” re-
sponses for the question of w
hether the spinach version of the story can be 
regarded as a joke lies betw
een 49.48%
 and 69.72%





, and for the m
oral ver-





Because of the w
ithin-subjects design of the present study and the 
non-norm






as conducted to test for differences in how
 funny partic-
ipants found each of the jokes. The results indicate that the spinach version 
w
as perceived as funnier (m
ean rank = 37.24) than the science version (Z (97) 
= -4.042, p < .001). Results also show
 that the spinach version w
as perceived as 
funnier (m
ean rank = 40.75) than the m
oral version (Z (97) = -6.893, p < .001). 
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[1] It feels m
ore like disagreeing over w
hich chocolate is better
[2] It feels m
ore like disagreeing over w
hether hum





Appendix 4: The counterfactual question






ow, had our relevant practices and beliefs regarding sm
oking 
been different - had w
e been ok w
ith it, had w




as actually quite harm
less - w
ould it still have been true that sm
ok-
ing causes cancer? It is probably uncontroversial that the answ
er is “Yes”. The 
effects of sm
oking on our health do not depend on our beliefs and practices. 
Rather, it is an objective m
atter of fact. 
 The question that w
e therefore ask here is “H
ad our beliefs and practices 
been very different, w
ould it still have been true that so-and-so?”
 Let us apply this question to m
orality.  For exam
ple, som








aybe you do not. If you do not, im
agine som
ething else that 
you think is m
orally w
rong. W
ould it still have been w
rong had our relevant 
practices and beliefs been different? 
 [1] N










Appendix 3: The phenom
enology of disagreem
ent




ay engage in 
a disagreem
ent about w
hether bitter chocolate tastes better than m
ilk choc-
olate. W
e can also disagree about w
hether hum






ever, different. In the chocolate 
case, it feels like stating one’s ow
n preference, and perhaps trying to influ-
ence the listener into getting his ow
n preferences in line. In the global w
arm
-
ing case, though, it feels like trying to get at an objective truth, one that is 
there anyw
ay, independently of our beliefs and preferences. That is, either 
hum
an actions contribute to global w
arm
ing, or they do not.  
 In this part of the study, w
e w
ill consider w








ple, about the 
m
oral status of abortion. Suppose that you are engaged in such a disagree-
m
ent. Im
agine this, as it w
ere, from
 the inside. You are in this disagreem
ent 
yourself. Perhaps you think that there is nothing w
rong w
ith abortion, and 
you are arguing w
ith som
eone w




perhaps you think that abortion is m
orally w




ho thinks that there is nothing w
rong w
ith it.   
 Please explain how
 it feels for you to engage in this kind of disagreem
ent. 
Please note that there is no correct answ






 it feels for you to engage in m
oral disagreem
ents. In partic-
ular, please tell us w
hether it feels m
ore like disagreeing over w
hether bitter 
chocolate tastes, or like disagreeing over objective facts like w
hether hum
an 
actions contribute to global w
arm
ing or not? 







his chapter is co-authored by T
hom
as P
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1. Introduction
A central debate in m
etaethics concerns the existence of objective m
oral 
truths. These include in particular statem
ents about w
hether states of affairs 
are good or bad and w
hether actions are right or w
rong. In order for such 
statem
ents to be objectively true or false, our judgm
ents about such proper-
ties m
ust be true or false independently from
 the perspective or the beliefs of 
specific individuals and/or cultures. Som
e philosophers affi
rm
 the existence 
of objective m
oral truths (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989, Sm
ith 1994) w
hile others 
deny it (Ayer 1936; Blackburn 1993; M
ackie 1977). M
ost philosophers agree, 
how
ever, that ordinary people are m
oral objectivists, the thesis of folk m
oral 
objectivism
 that I have discussed before (FM
O). Indeed, a prevailing assum
p-
tion is that m





There are even philosophers w
ho argue that the fact that people are m
or-
al objectivists supports the thesis of m
oral objectivism
 itself, w
hich is an ar-
gum
ent that is called “the presum
ptive argum






aughton 1988). According to this 
argum
ent, the fact that people believe that m
oral judgm
ents are objectively 
true or false provides a prim
a facie reason to believe that m
oral objectivism
 is 
true. In other w
ords, they claim
 that m
etaethical theories should take m
oral 
objectivism
 as point of departure unless there are strong argum
ents against 
the existence of objective m
oral truths. A particularly influential form
ulation 
of this argum
ent can be found in Brink: 
In m




 is the 
natural m
etaphysical position. […
] So too, I think, in ethics. […
] if this 
claim
 about the realist nature of m
oral inquiry is right, w
e have reason 
to accept m
oral realism




. (Brink 1989, p. 23-24) 16
16  Theories in m








etaethics is that lay people believe that m
oral 
judgm
ents are objectively true or false. This is the assum






 has been investigated by testing w
hether or not peo-
ple believe that m
oral statem
ents w





ply that at least one party is m












e developed a 
survey to test w






 four different dom
ains: preferences, conventions, 
science, and m
orality. And w
e test, both abstractly and concretely, w
hether or 
not in each of the dom
ains people believe that objective progress, know
ledge, 
and m
istakes are possible. O
ur results show
 that people tend to believe that, 
in contrast to the scientific dom
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Recent psychological research on folk m
etaethics has investigated Independ-
ence and Exclusion. Prim
a facie, the results of those studies do not univocally 
support FM
O. There seem
s to be a large inter- and intrapersonal variance in 
how




er or not m
oral disagreem
ents im
ply that at m
ost one party can be correct. 
H
ow
ever, in light of the discussion in Chapter 1, w
e should be careful in inter-
preting those results as evidence against FM
O





e philosophers believe that FM
O





ents (Brink, 1989; Björnsson 2012; Enoch, 2014) and as discussed in 
Chapter 1 and 3, it is not entirely clear w
hether existing em
pirical research 
provides evidence for im






therefore need is m
easurem
ent instrum
ents that correctly identify w
hat 
people are im




ill then be able to 
answ
er the question w
hether people are im










easures that are 




that they provide us w
ith the possibility to carefully distinguish different m
e-
taethical view




f course, there is a 
valid w
orry that relatively explicit m





hich according to som




ever, the fact that m
easurem
ent instrum
ents are explicit does not im
ply 







e use scenarios of previous research as input, this w
ill provide us w
ith 
the possibility to com
pare our results w
ith those of existing research.
 
The question that is addressed here is w
hether people believe in m
oral 
progress, know
ledge and error. To answ
er these questions, w





ent is not entirely undisputed (for instance, see Loeb 
2007; Pölzler 2018) but it has not been scrutinized em
pirically. If FM
O
 is false, 
the argum
ent loses m
uch of its force.
 
According to Brink (and other proponents of the presum
ptive argum
ent), 
five features of ordinary m
oral thought and practice particularly show
 that 
people take m







CE: People believe that m
oral sentences are true or false  
 


































e believe that it w
ould also be valuable to in-
vestigate Progress, Know
ledge, and Error. If w
e obtain em
pirical evidence for 
FM
O
 then this w
ould support the idea that FM
O




etaethical theories. In contrast, if w






ant to consider to w
hat extent m












ould potentially benefit m
etaethical theorizing and w
e 
w
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they treat statem
ents about conventions and personal preferences. In sta-
tistical term
s, our null hypothesis is that there are no differences, along the 
dim
ensions of progress, know
ledge, and error, in how
 people treat m
oral 
statem
ents versus other kinds of statem
ents and our alternative hypothesis 





e recruited 453 participants via the online service Am
azon M
echanical 
Turk. They received $0.80 for their tim
e. To prevent that som
e participants do 
not take the cognitive effort needed to provide valid responses w
e included 
several attention checks and m




uang et al. 2012; Pölzler forthcom
ing). 26 participants w
ere excluded 
from
 statistical analyses because they failed w
ith regard to at least one 
attention check. 18 participants w
ere excluded because they finished the sur-
vey very fast. Analyses w






ly distributed to an abstract version of the study 
or to a concrete version, m
aking version a betw







ent belonged to one of four dom
ains (m
orality, social conventions, personal 
preferences, and science) and w
as assessed along each of three dim
ensions 
(progress, know






in-subjects factors. The abstract version for each dom
ain consisted of the 




ventions, personal preferences and science in general —
 along all three di-
m
ensions. This im
plies a total of 12 evaluations. The concrete version involved 
three concrete statem
ents for each of the social conventions, personal pref-
erences, and science dom
ains, and nine statem
ents for the m
orality dom
ain. 
This yielded a total of 18 concrete statem
ents that w
ere each evaluated on all 
2. The present research
W
e investigate w




portantly, there is a difference betw
een believing that m
oral progress, 
know
ledge, and/or error is possible versus that it obtains. FM
O
 requires that 
people believe in the possibility of progress/know
ledge/error and not neces-
sarily that m
oral progress has occurred, or that m
oral know










 at testing w








ould like to know
 w
hether people believe in m
oral pro-
gress/know
ledge/error in a w
ay that corresponds to FM
O. It is possible, how
-
ever, that people believe that m
oral progress, know
ledge, and/or error is 
possible but not objectively speaking. For instance, perhaps people believe 
that there is only the possibility of progress/know
ledge/error in a subjectivist 
sense. That is, according to the perspective or the beliefs of specific individu-
als and/or cultures. For instance, w
ith regard to m
oral error, perhaps people 
believe that m
oral error is only possible in the sense of failing to grasp one’s 
ow
n m
oral beliefs or the beliefs of one’s ow
n culture. 17 O
f course it is also 
possible that people do not believe that m
oral judgm
ents are objectively true 
or false and that m
oral progress, know
ledge, or error is not possible. 
 
Finally, existing research has show
n that people tend to respond differ-
ently to abstract versus concrete cases (N
ichols &






e therefore test people’s responses both in an abstract and 
in a concrete condition. For these reasons, w
e developed a study in w
hich 
people can indicate, both abstractly and for concrete cases, w
hether or not 
they think that m
oral progress/know
ledge/error is objectively or subjectively 
possible or that it is not possible at all. 
 
W
e hypothesize that FM
O
 is true and that therefore people w
ill, along 
the dim
ensions of progress, know





ilar as they treat scientific statem




oreover, error theorists (according to w
hom
 all of our m
oral judgem
ents are m
istaken) also grant 
that m
oral errors are possible.
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(2) There can be or has been progress but only from
 the perspective of par-
ticular cultures or individuals. 







 to you that the question of w
hether X is such that, under favora-
ble circum
stances, a person can know
 the answ
er to this question (i.e., can 
have a justified and true belief about it)?
(1) It is possible to acquire such know
ledge by investigating the objective 
truth about this question. 
(2) It is possible to acquire such know
ledge but only by investigating one’s 
culture’s or one’s ow
n beliefs about this question. 
(3) It is not possible to acquire know









rong is such that, at least under favorable circum
stances, a person can 
err about the answ
er to this question (i.e., can give a false answ
er to it)?
(1) It is possible to m
ake such an error in the sense of failing to grasp the ob-
jective truth about this question. 
(2) It is possible to m
ake such an error but only in the sense of failing to grasp 
one’s culture’s or one’s ow
n beliefs about this question. 
(3) It is not possible to m
ake an error about this question.
three dim
ensions, for a total of 54 evaluations. Each version (abstract and con-
crete) and each dom
ain (m
orality, social conventions, personal preferences, 
and science) w
ere random
ized. The design is sum
m
arized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Num
ber of evaluations per version (abstract v. concrete)  
X dim
ension (progress, know
ledge, error) X dom
ain (m
orality,  


















































ote: In the abstract version, four statem
ents w
ere each evaluated along the 
three dim
ensions; in the concrete version, 18 statem
ents w
ere each evaluated 






hether a participant affi
rm
ed the possibility of objective m
or-
al progress, objective m
oral know













 to you that, at least over long periods of tim
e, progress can be or 
has been m
ade w
ith regard to the question of w
hether X (i.e., answ
ers to this 
question cannot only change but becom
e better)?
(1) There can be or has been progress in the sense of (com
ing closer to) dis-
covering the objective truth about this question. 
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ne ought not speak w
ith one’s m
outh full. 





Getting tattoos and/or body piercings is okay.
Shakespeare is a better w
riter than is D
an Brow
n (author of The D
a Vinci Code).
Classical m




The earth is flat.
Boston (M









pleting all tasks described above, participants w
ere again presented 
w
ith the list of our 18 concrete statem
ents and w
ere asked the follow
ing re-
quest: “Below
 you find a num
ber of statem
ents. For each of these statem
ents 
please indicate w
hether you think that it is prim
arily about m
orality, social 
conventions, personal preferences or scientific facts.” This task allow
ed us to 
address the potential objection that participants’ m
oral progress, know
ledge 





favor of or against m









right et al. 2013).
2.3 Results

















ains. The statistical null hypotheses that w
e test are thus that 
Based on our considerations in Section 1, w




 and (2) and (3) answ





















ere included for three reasons. First, to provide a bench-
m
ark against w
hich to assess w
hether or not m
oral statem
ents are interpreted 
in an objectivist sense. W
e assum




tivity for scientific statem
ents and tow
ards subjectivity or non-objectivity for 
the statem




ould prevent participants from
 answ
ering all tasks 
in the sam
e w
ay. That is, the com
parison of statem
ents from
 different kinds 
of dom
ains m











 that people m










ere are the statem
ents from





hich are taken from
 or based on Goodw
in and D
arley 












It is good to do unto others as you w
ould have them
 do onto you.
A country w
ith the death penalty is m
orally w






Siblings ought not to kiss each other on the m
outh passionately. 
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Table 2. Overall percentages of “objective” answ
ers to statem
ents, by version 
(abstract v. concrete) X dim
ension (progress, know
ledge, error) X dom
ain 
(m










































































ote: a based on 1 statem
ent per participant; b based on 3 statem
ents per par-
ticipant; c based on 9 statem
ents per participant; N
 = 216 participants in the 
abstract version and N
 = 193 participants in the concrete version
Table 2 reveals a very consistent pattern in the data, seem
ingly going against 
the null hypotheses. In both abstract and concrete tasks, and along all three 
dim
ensions (progress, know
ledge, and error), scientific statem
ents are con-







portantly, the evaluation of m
oral statem
ents does not 
seem
 to differ from
 the evaluation of statem
ents from





ally test the hypotheses, w
e estim
ate m
ultilevel logistic regressions 
using the Gibbs sam
pler em
bedded in the O
penBUGS language. Evaluations of 
statem
ents (level 1) are nested in participants (level 2). The response varia-
ble in all analyses is the logarithm




er “objective”. The m
odel equation has a random
 term
 (intercept) for 
each participant. Uninform
ative priors are used for all (hyper-)param
eters.
people are equally objectivist in the m
orality dom
ain, along the dim
ensions 
of progress, know
ledge, and error, com




 the abstract and concrete tasks are analyzed separately. Refer-
ring to Table 1 above, this im
plies that analyses are perform
ed dow
n each of 
the 6 colum
ns, separately. The first tw
o colum
ns pertain to the abstract and 





ill refer to as H
y-
pothesis 1. The third and fourth colum






ill refer to as H
ypothesis 2. Finally, 
the fifth and sixth colum








ent participants indicated w
hether they believe objective 
progress, know




er categories into “objective” (1) and 
“not objective” (2 or 3). W
e em
ployed a w
ithin-subjects design and observa-
tions (evaluations of statem
ents) are therefore nested in participants, leading 
to dependent observations (e.g., Gelm
an and H
ill 2007; Snijders and Bosk-
er 2011). W









ented in the O








verall, there are 409 participants, of w
hom
 216 w
ere assigned to the abstract 
version and 193 to the concrete version. O
f the participants taking the ab-
stract version 117 self-identified as m
ale and 99 as fem
ale; m
ean age in the 
abstract version w
as 35.86 years (sd = 10.39). O
f the participants taking the 
concrete version 109 self-identified as m
ale, 82 as fem
ale, and 2 as “other”; 
m
ean age in the concrete version w
as 36.95 years (sd = 11.19). Table 2 below
 
presents the percentages of “objective” answ
ers for all statem
ents, broken 
dow
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provides a m
ore nuanced picture. H
ere too, m
oral statem
ents are evaluated 
in a significantly less objectivist m
anner than scientific statem
ents (b = 1.01, 
se = .11, p < .05). H
ow
ever, contrary to the abstract version, m
oral statem
ents 
are evaluated in a m
ore objectivist m
anner than statem
ents about personal 
preferences (b = -.51, se = .12, p < 0.05) and statem
ents about social conven-
tions (b = -.24, se = .12, p < 0.05). The inclusion of control variables in M
odel 





Table 4. Results of m
ultilevel logistic regressions w
ith log odds of 
“possibility of know
ledge” as response variable; the m
orality dom
ain  


























































ith 3 chains, each w
ith 5000 iterations (first 2500 










-CI does not contain 0; 864 statem
ent evaluations (level 1) nested in 216 
participants (level 2) in the abstract m
odels; 3474 statem
ent evaluations (level 





odels for both the abstract and concrete versions: m
odels 
I and III w
ithout control variables, and m
odels II and IV w
ith gender and age 
as control variables. In all m
odels, m




Table 3. Results of m
ultilevel logistic regressions w
ith log odds of 
“possibility of progress” as response variable; the m
orality dom
ain 


























































ith 3 chains, each w
ith 5000 iterations (first 2500 










-CI does not contain 0; 864 statem
ent evaluations (level 1) nested in 216 
participants (level 2) in the abstract m
odels; 3474 statem
ent evaluations (level 
1) nested in 193 participants (level 2)






odels I and III w
ithout control variables, and m
odels II and IV w
ith gender 
and age as control variables. In all m
odels, m
orality is the reference category. 
For the abstract version, M
odel I strongly refutes the first hypothesis: m
oral 
statem
ents are evaluated in a significantly less objectivist m
anner than are 
scientific statem




ents are treated com
pared to statem
ents about 
personal preferences (b = .11, se = .22, p > 0.05) and statem
ents about social 
conventions (b = .02, se = .22, p > 0.05). Adding controls for age and gender 
in M
odel II, neither of w
hich is significantly associated w
ith the response 


























odels for both the abstract and concrete versions: m
odels 
I and III w
ithout control variables, and m
odels II and IV w
ith gender and age 
as control variables. In all m
odels, m
orality is the reference category. For the 
abstract version, M
odel I refutes hypothesis 1: m
oral statem
ents are 
evaluated in a less objectivist m
anner than scientific statem
ents (b = 1.86, se 
= .26, p < .05), and there is no difference w
ith personal preferences (b = -.10, 
se = .22, p > .05) or statem
ents about social conventions (b = .33, se = .22, p 
> .05). Including the controls age and gender in M
odel II do not significantly 
change the outcom
es. Sim
ilar as for the results on m
oral progress and m
oral 
error, the results for the concrete version in M




ents are evaluated in a significantly less objectivist m
anner than 
scientific statem
ents (b = .97, se = .11, p < . 05). Contrary to the abstract ver-
sion, m
oral statem
ents are evaluated in a m
ore objectivist m
anner than are 
statem








Table 6. Results of m
ultilevel logistic regressions w
ith log odds of 
“objective” as response variable; dom
ains are based on participants’ 
ow
n categorizations of statem
ents from
 the concrete version; the m
oral 
dom












































































odel I strongly refutes hypothesis 1: m
oral statem
ents are 
evaluated in a less objectivist m
anner than are scientific statem
ents (b = 2.14, se = 
.25, p < .05), and there is no difference w
ith personal preferences (b = .13, se = .21, 
p > .05) or statem
ents about social conventions (b = .32, se = .22, p > .05). Includ-
ing the controls age and gender in M
odel II do not significantly change the out-
com
es. Sim
ilar as for the results on m
oral progress, the results for the concrete 
version in M
odel III are slightly m
ore nuanced. M
oral statem
ents are evaluated 
in a significantly less objectivist m
anner than are scientific statem
ents (b = 1.80, 
se = .11, p < .05). Contrary to the abstract version, m
oral statem
ents are evaluated 
in a m
ore objectivist m
anner than are statem
ents about personal preferences (b 







Table 5. Results of m
ultilevel logistic regressions w
ith log odds of 
“possibility of error” as response variable; the m
orality dom
ain is  


























































ith 3 chains, each w
ith 5000 iterations (first 2500 










-CI does not contain 0; 864 statem
ent evaluations (level 1) nested in 216 
participants (level 2) in the abstract m
odels; 3474 statem
ent evaluations (level 
1) nested in 193 participants (level 2)
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that FM
O











ents only, the results of this research are only relevant for FM
O



















e of our m
easurem
ent instrum
ents are fairly explicit and it is therefore 
possible that w
e m
easure people’s explicit com
m
itm
ents. If so and if FM
O
 
does not apply to explicit com
m
itm
ents, our results m
ay not provide evi-
dence for FM
O
 but still be interesting for philosophers and psychologists in-















ents. I therefore conclude that at this point w
e cannot be sure that 
this research provides evidence for FM
O.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, w
e investigated w
hether people believe in the possibility of ob-
jective m
oral progress, know
ledge, and error. W
e assum
ed that people treat 
science, abstractly, and scientific statem
ents concretely, as if this dom
ains 
concerns objective facts. W
e also assum
ed that if people believe in the objec-
tivity of m
oral judgm
ents, the results w
e obtain for science and m
orality both 




 that people 
treat science, both abstractly and concretely, as if objectivism




ever, our results also show
 that they treat m
orality differently. 





tute evidence against FM
O
 depends on the nature of FM
O, m
ore precisely on 
w
hether it concerns im










ith 3 chains, each w
ith 5000 iterations (first 2500 










-CI does not contain 0; 3474 statem
ent evaluations (level 1) nested in 193 
participants (level 2)
W
e also calculated m
odels for m
oral progress, know
ledge, and error, based 
on people’s ow
n categorizations of statem
ents in the dom
ains of science, m
o-
rality, personal preferences, and social conventions. Those results are largely 
sim
ilar to the results w
ithout subjective categorizations.  
3. Discussion
Previous research has investigated w
hether or not people believe that m
or-
al statem
ents are true or false and w








right et al. 2013, 2014; Pölzler 2018; Pölzler and 
W
right forthcom
ing). Those results do not provide evidence in favor of FM
O. 
In light of our discussion in Chapter 3, w
e should not interpret those findings 
as providing evidence against FM
O
 either. In this paper, w
e used a different 
m
ethodology to investigate w
hether FM
O
 is true, nam
ely by testing w
hether 
people believe in objective m
oral progress, know




 that people believe that science (abstractly) is, and 
scientific statem
ents (concretely) are, a m
atter of objectivity. For progress, 
know
ledge, and error, people treat m
orality significantly differently. For all 
the abstract questions, m
orality is believed to be on a par w
ith personal pref-
erences and conventions. W
ith regard to the concrete statem
ents, results are 
slightly m
ore nuanced. For the concrete questions, people seem
 to believe 
that m
oral statem




ents about personal preferences or social conventions. 
 







ents and that som






provide evidence against FM
O. First, the m
easurem
ent instrum
ents that are 
















ents, it is not clear w






In the second chapter I investigated w
hether the psychological construct 




n as ‘perceived objectivity’, is best m
easured 
on a single dim
ension or is m
ultidim
ensional. To investigate w
hether this is 
the case, I conducted an exploratory factor analysis on a range of ethical state-
m
ents. The results suggest that there are at least three distinct dim
ensions 
that underlie people’s m
etaethical judgm
ents, nam
ely Independent Truth, 
Universal Truth, and D
ivine Truth. A confirm
atory factor analysis confirm
s 
the three-factor structure and reliability tests suggest that each dim
ension 
form
s reliable subscales. The studies that I used to validate the m
easurem
ent 
scale suggest that each of these dim




easure. For instance, it seem
s that scores on 





scores on Independent Truth have the opposite effect.
 
In the third chapter I investigated w







e philosophers believe that FM
O










tivity even if they explicitly deny that this is the case. I therefore em
pirically 
investigated w
hether there is evidence to support this claim





ents, I used three tests developed by D
avid Enoch.  Enoch 
claim
s that people w
ill respond to those tests as if m
oral objectivism
 is true, 
even if they explicitly reject m
oral objectivism
. The results show
 that for each 
of those tests, people seem
 to support the idea that m
oral objectivism




e should be careful to interpret these results as support 
for FM
O. For instance, w
hen w
e com
bine results of tw
o of Enoch’s tests, w
e 
observe that only half of his participants respond in a w
ay that supports FM
O
 




 thesis, I have investigated w
hether a specific m
etaethical assum
p-
tion is true, nam






to find out w
hether people believe that m
oral judgm
ents are objectively true 
or false. To achieve this, I evaluated w




 and I conducted em
pirical studies to inves-
tigate w
hether people are im





this research provides no hard evidence for FM
O. 
 
The conclusions of this m
anuscript are as follow
s. First, existing research 
has often used m







cult to assess w
hether results pertain 
to FM





















ent tasks, it is not clear w







ever, given the experim
ental designs that are 
em
ployed, w
hich often contain the repetitive use of explicit m
etaethical lan-





pirical studies in Chapter 2 suggest that there are at least three 
dim
ensions of thinking about m
oral truth that underlie perceived objectiv-
ity. M
oreover, people’s scores on those dim
ensions are differently related to 
tolerance and a w
illingness to harm
 m
easure. Finally, research conducted as 
part of this thesis provides som
e support for the idea that people are im
plic-
itly m
oral objectivists but these results are not conclusive. To obtain a better 
picture of the results of this research, I w
ill discuss each chapter separately.
 
In the first chapter, I discussed existing research on folk m
etaethics. The 
results suggest that people are not univocally com
m
itted to FM
O. In fact, there 
seem
s to be hardly any participant w





 is true. M
ore specifically, the results show
 large differ-
ences betw
een different individuals w




 to treat statem
ents differently based on m
oral content. Although 











ill lead us to conclude that FM
O






























endation is directed to em
pir-





e have a 
clear conceptual distinction betw
een im





can then assess w













ents and the distinction betw
een them
. If w




 applies to im






hether or not FM
O
 is true. W
e can then also assess w
hether it is peo-
ple’s im
plicit and/or explicit com
m
itm
ents that are m
ultidim
ensional or are 
associated w
ith people’s tolerance judgm
















people believe in the possibility of m
oral progress, know










ains of science, personal 
preferences, and social conventions. For the abstract questions, people w
ere 
asked w
hether they believe in the possibility of objective m
oral progress, 
know
ledge, and error. For the concrete questions, people w
ere adm
inistered 
concrete cases and they w
ere asked w
hether or not they believe in the pos-
sibility of objective m
oral progress, know
ledge and error. O
ur results show
 




ever, people treat m
orality differently. That is, for the 
abstract cases m
oral m
atters are treated as on a par w
ith personal preferenc-




ore objective than statem
ents about personal preferences or 
social conventions. 
 
In short, the em
pirical results presented in this PhD
 thesis do not univo-
cally support FM
O. The results of existing research, and those presented in 
Chapter 2 suggest that FM
O
 is false. H
ow





ay elicit explicit com
m
itm








ents (see Chapter 3), w
e should not interpret those find-
ings as evidence against FM
O. W
e can draw
 several lessons from
 the research 
presented in this PhD
-thesis and I w
ill present them





First, philosophers should be precise about w






pirical thesis like FM
O, w
hich includes the ques-
tion of w
hether or not FM
O
 necessarily pertains to im






 is usually defended by observations of ordinary m
oral 
discourse and appeals to intuitions. H
ow
ever, appearances can be deceiving. 
Even if em
pirical researchers have not alw









 NOT TO ARGUE ABOUT IS/
OUGHT INFERENCES IN THE 
COGNITIVE SCIENCES
18
18  This chapter is co-authored by K
atina Q
uintelier and accepted as a paper at Frontiers in Psychology.
123
124










UGHT INFERENCE IN THE CO
GNITIVE SCIENCES  APPENDIX A 
Prem
ise: M
ore intelligent people are m
ore likely than less intelligent people 
to m
ake a guess, instead of reason, w
hen solving the W
ason Selection Task.
Conclusion: W
e ought to m




This inference can be interpreted as a deductive argum
ent. As such, the con-
clusion is true if the inference is valid and sound. A deductive inference is 
valid if the prem
ises logically entail the conclusions, hence, if it is logically 
im
possible for the prem
ises to be true and the conclusion false. In this infer-
ence, it is possible that the prem
ise is true w
hile the conclusion is false. Thus, 
it is deductively invalid.
 
Soundness takes the actual truth of the prem
ises (and conclusions) into 
account: An inference is sound if it is valid and all of its prem
ises are true. 
The inference in this exam




ere it to be valid, it w
ould still be unsound because the prem
ise is false. 
M
ore intelligent people are in fact m
ore likely than less intelligent people to 
reason logically w
hen solving the W




An inference can also be interpreted as a defeasible argum
ent. D
efeasible 
inferences have several features, tw
o of w
hich are relevant for our argum
ent 
(cf. Pollock, 1987, 1992). First, the inference can be correct even if it is not 
deductively valid. Let us illustrate these features on the basis of the follow
ing 
inference (w
hich is not an is/ought inference) (2):
Prem
ise: X looks red to m
e.
Conclusion: X is red.
Clearly, the prem
ise does not logically entail the conclusion. H
ow
ever, the in-
ference is defeasibly correct because the prem
ise supports the conclusion—
m
ost things that look red to m










oore’s fallacy (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqa-
yam
 and Evans, 2011). Although inferring “ought” from
 “is” can be prob-
lem
atic, w
e argue that, in the context of contem











ents concern the validity and soundness of deduc-
tive inferences w
hile in our view
 contem
porary IOI›s in the cognitive sciences 
are better interpreted as defeasible inferences.
 
In order to avoid m
isinterpretations, w
e first clarify key concepts in the 
debate in section Key Concepts. In section M






ents against inferring “ought” from




porary IOI’s in the cognitive sciences.
2. Key Concepts
Participants in the is/ought debate distinguish betw
een descriptive state-
m
ents and deontic statem
ents. D
escriptive statem












ents are descriptive statem
ents, “ought” statem
ents can 
be descriptive as w
ell as deontic. For instance, “the streets ought to be w
et 
because it is raining” is a descriptive statem
ent because it predicts that the 
streets w
ill be w
et. Conversely, “If you do not w
ant to get w
et, you ought to car-
ry an um
brella,” is a deontic statem
ent because it prescribes w
hat you should 
do. In this com
m
ent, w
e only discuss “ought” statem




ill not discuss inferences from
 “is” to descriptive 
“oughts” (cf. O
aksford and Chater, 2009, 2011), but only inferences from
 “is” 
to deontic “oughts” (cf. O




e describe an is/ought inference as an attem
pt to evaluate (i.e., fine-
tune, develop, arbitrate betw
een) deontic statem
ents on the basis of descrip-
tive statem
ents. The follow
ing is an exam
ple of an IOI (1):
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sciences, their argum
ents are applied to epistem
ic “oughts.” This is accept-





hold at least for deontic “oughts” in general (Pigden, 2010; P. 240). In contrast, 
it is unclear if M
oore’s fallacy applies to the sam
e extent to non-ethical deon-
tic “oughts.” For the sake of argum
ent though, w
e assum
e that both fallacies 







e’s fallacy. The standard interpretation of H
um
e’s 
fallacy states that there are no deductively valid inferences w
hose prem
is-
es contain no “oughts” and w
hose conclusions contain (non-trivial) “oughts” 
(Schurz, 1997; Pigden, 2010; p. 198–242). For exam
ple, the follow
ing infer-
ence is not deductively valid (3):
Prem
ise: It is the case that hum
an beings apply Bayesian reasoning.
Conclusion: It ought to be the case that hum
an beings apply Bayesian  
reasoning.
This inference is not deductively valid because it is possible that the conclu-
sions are false w
hile the prem
ises are true. In H
um
e’s w
ords, “ought, or ought 
not, expresses som
e new
 relation or affi
rm
ation,” w
hich is different than the 
relation being expressed by “is,” or “is not” (1739–1740, Book III, Part I, sec-
tion Key Concepts). W
hen scholars infer “ought” related conclusions from
 
prem










e also argues that w




a bridge principle - that connects “is” and “ought.” W
e can for exam
ple suggest 
the follow
ing bridge principle: “if m
ore intelligent people apply reasoning X, 
w








ore intelligent people apply Bayesian reasoning.
Prem
ise 2: If m
ore intelligent people apply Bayesian reasoning, w
e ought 
to apply Bayesian reasoning.
Conclusion: W
e ought to apply Bayesian reasoning.
A second feature of defeasible inferences is that, w
hen the inference is correct, 
it can still be revised in the light of new
 inform
ation. For instance, if w
e learn 
that X is a daisy that is illum
inated by red lights, w
hich can m
ake things appear 
red w
hen they are not, w
e m
ay suggest the follow
ing revised inference (3):
  Prem
ise 1: X looks red to m
e.
Prem
ise 2: X is a daisy that is illum
inated by red lights, w
hich can m
ake 
things appear red w
hen they are not.
Conclusion: X is not red.
W
hile correct defeasible inferences can be revised in the light of new
 infor-
m
ation, valid deductive inferences cannot: If the conclusion follow
s deduc-
tively from
 a (set of) prem
ise(s), it w
ill still follow






e add. (This is term
ed the m
onotonicity of deductive logic.)
 
All this is relevant for is/ought debates. In section M






ents concern the validity and soundness of 
deductive inferences. In section A D
ebate Shackled, w
e explain w
hy IOI’s in 










 people ought to reason on the basis of theories and data of how
 people 
do reason (for a discussion and critique, see Elqayam
 and Evans, 2011). Critics 
(e.g., Schneider, 2000; Schroyens, 2009; Elqayam
 and Evans, 2011) claim
 that 
som








er, in line w
ith previous interpretations, w




fallacies in the first place preclude deductive inferences that are, respectively, 
not valid and not sound (cf. Schurz, 1997; Pigden, 2010; Quintelier et al., 2011).
 






ents in the context of ethical “oughts.” H
ow
ever, in the cognitive  
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ore intelligent people are m
ore likely than 
less intelligent people to reason logically in task A.
Conclusion: W
e ought to reason logically in task A.
O
aksford and Sellen (2000) rem
ark that the follow
ing also holds (6):
Prem
ise: Studies show
 that high schizotypal people are m
ore likely than 
low
 schizotypal people to reason logically in task B.
Conclusion: W
e ought not to reason logically in task B.
Clearly, these inferences are not deductively valid (cf. Schneider, 2000). H
ow
-
ever, these authors never claim
ed that their prem
ise deductively entails a de-
ontic conclusion. Instead, both Stanovich and W
est, 2000; p. 645) and O
aks-
ford and Sellen, 2000; p. 691) speak of descriptive inform
ation that suggests a 
certain deontic conclusion. M
oreover, these argum
ents are revisable in 
the light of new
 inform
ation: W
hat if, for instance, both schizotypy and 
intelligence are positively correlated w
ith logical reasoning in the sam
e task 
A? In that case, w
e have to revise our conclusions that w
e ought to reason log-
ically in task A. Thus, inferences 5 and 6 are better understood as defeasible 




ise suggests that, in certain cases, descriptive infor-
m
ation can be used to inform
 us about deontic statem
ents. H






an beings update on conditionals by applying rule X.
Conclusion: H
um
an beings ought to update on conditionals by applying 
rule X.
This inference is now
 deductively valid: if the prem
ises are true, then the con-
clusion is also true. H
um
e’s fallacy does not preclude the possibility of finding 
a plausible bridge principle.
 
In contrast, M
oore’s fallacy states that deductive IOI’s w
ith bridge princi-
ples m
ight be valid, but they are never sound. The reason is that, according 
to M
oore, bridge principles can never be true. M
oore’s argum
ent is that w
e 
should find an analytically true bridge principle, one that spells out w
hat de-
scriptive concepts are in the m





oore, this is im
possible because deontic concepts 
are already sim
ple term
s; there is nothing in their m
eaning than the deontic 
concept itself. Therefore, there are no true bridge principles. Those w
ho de-
fine a deontic concept in descriptive term
s and then claim
 that this definition 








e hold that H
um
e’s fallacy states that deductive IOI’s are 
never valid w
ithout a bridge principle, w
hile M
oore’s thesis states that deduc-
tive IOI’s are never sound because there is no true bridge principle.




oore’s fallacy to criticize IOI’s in the cognitive scienc-
es can be problem
atic: If, by m
aking an is/ought inference, authors rarely 
m
ean to deduce deontic “oughts” from
 “isses,” then their IOI’s should not be 
evaluated on the basis of their deductive validity or soundness. Indeed, w
e 
argue that it is m
ore charitable to interpret contem
porary IOI’s in the cogni-
tive sciences as defeasible inferences: Relevant authors (O
aksford and Sellen, 
2000; Stanovich and W
est, 2000; D
ouven, 2011) point to descriptive reasons 




ake correct inferences that are revisable in the light of 
new
 inform
ation. Let us take a look at these features of contem
porary IOI’s in 
the cognitive sciences.
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Again, as a deductive inference, this w




(2011) does not seem
 to have a deductive inference in m
ind. In his w
ords, 
the prem
ise again “suggests” the conclusion, and descriptive inform
ation 
leads to an “outline” of norm
s or, based on the prem
ise, w
e can go “som
e 
w
ay” in accepting the conclusion (253). This can be understood as a first 
approxim
ation that can be revised. M
oreover, there is no m
entioning that 
descriptive prem
ises logically entail a deontic conclusion.
 
These exam
ples lead us to conclude that IOI’s in the cognitive sciences are 
better interpreted as defeasible inferences than as deductive inferences. As a 
consequence, their deductive validity and soundness is not at stake. W
e there-
fore suggest that, instead of referring to H
um
e or M
oore, critics of is/ought 
inferences apply evaluation criteria for defeasible inferences (see e.g., N
ute, 
1997). This conclusion supplem
ents previous w
ork on the is/ought problem
. 
Schurz (in Pigden, 2010; p. 216), for instance, suggests that defeasible condi-
tional norm
s m
ight provide plausible bridge principles in ethical is/ought in-
ferences. O
ther authors suggest that defeasible reasoning can solve problem
s 
and paradoxes occurring in m





ork usually focused on ethical “oughts” rather than epistem
ic 
“oughts.” W
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aar op een vergelijkbare w
ijze als “3 m
aal 3 is 9”, “schi-
zofrenie is erfelijk”, of “Zw
olle ligt ten noorden van Groningen”, 
nam
elijk in de zin dat de w
aarheid van m
orele uitspraken onafhankelijk is 
van ons denken. Som
m
ige filosofen denken dat het feit dat m
ensen dit gelo-




et idee dat m
ensen geloven dat m










In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik of er em
pirisch bew
ijs is voor FM
O. H
et 
achterliggende idee is dat het vinden van em
pirische evidentie ondersteu-
ning geeft aan filosofische theorieën die FM
O




en ontbreekt dan kan dit betekenen 






e bevindingen uit dit proefschrift kunnen in dit geval bijdragen aan 
de ontw
ikkeling van een nieuw
e visie op de m
etaethische overtuigingen van 
m
ensen en de filosofische im




envatting bespreek ik eerst m
ijn algem
ene bevindingen en 
vervolgens geef ik per hoofdstuk een korte toelichting op ieder afzonderlijk 
onderzoek. D








oord ik als volgt: Bestaand em
pirisch onder-







Een van de redenen hiervoor is dat in bestaand onderzoek vaak m
eetinstru-
m
enten heeft gebruikt die niet altijd tot valide uitkom
sten hebben geleid. 
D
e experim
entele taken die zijn afgenom
en sluiten bijvoorbeeld niet uit dat 
m
ensen geloven dat m
orele oordelen subjectief w
aar of onw





Een andere reden is dat er een onderscheid is tussen im
pliciete over-
tuigingen en expliciete overtuigingen. Laat m









aar is, zoals som
m
ige filosofen in hun theorieën doen, en tegelijk im
-




isschien denk je expli-
ciet dat alle m








eleens over de m
orele juistheid of toelaatbaarheid 
van een bepaalde handeling of stand van zaken. Filosofen noem
en zulke oor-
delen “eerste-orde oordelen”. Veel m
ensen vinden het bijvoorbeeld m
oreel 
juist dat de overheid ingrijpt indien een burger fysiek door een m
edeburger 
w
ordt bedreigd. Veel m
ensen vinden het m
oreel onjuist as iem
and fraude 
pleegt en daardoor m
isbruik m




abortus, euthanasie, en het hom
ohuw
elijk m
oreel toelaatbaar en ze vinden 
de doodstraf, m
arteling, liegen, en/of vreem
dgaan m
oreel ontoelaatbaar. Fi-
losofen gebruiken de term
 “norm
atieve ethiek” voor filosofisch onderzoek 
naar zulke eerste-orde oordelen. D
it proefschrift gaat echter over een vraag-
stuk in de m
etaethiek. D
e m





et vragen over de status van onze eerste-orde oordelen. M
e-
taethici onderzoeken bijvoorbeeld of onze m
orele oordelen als doel hebben 
de w
ereld te beschrijven zoals die is, en w
aar of onw
aar kunnen zijn, of dat ze 




at eerste- en tw
eede-orde vraagstukken uit elkaar lopen blijkt uit het 
volgende voorbeeld. Stel dat iem
and het eerste-orde oordeel velt dat abortus 
m
oreel ontoelaatbaar is. D
ie persoon kan tegelijk het tw
eede-orde oordeel 
hebben dat de uitspraak “abortus is m




isschien vindt die persoon dat het m
orele oordeel uitdrukking 
geeft aan zijn of haar gevoelens. 
 
D







e vraag of m
oreel objectivism
e w












anderen het tegenovergestelde betogen.
 
Veel filosofen denken, interessant genoeg, dat m
ensen denken dat m
ore-




ordt dus voorondersteld 
dat w
ij allem
aal geloven dat m
oreel objectivism
e w
aar is. Anders geform
u-
leerd, deze filosofen denken dat m
ensen m
orele uitspraken zoals “abortus is 










 ik als im
plicaties van FM
O. O
f het laatste 
criterium
, “Uniform
ity”, volgt uit FM
O




 betreft het idee dat m
ensen alle m




en en daar geen onderscheid in m
aken. In andere w
oor-
den, m




ige filosofen en psychologen bew
eren dat Uniform
ity van 
toepassing is op m




ijn evaluatie van bestaand onderzoek leidt tot de conclusie dat Indepen-
dence en Exclusion vaak w
orden geschonden. M
ensen lijken niet consistent 
te geloven dat m
orele uitspraken w
aar of onw
aar zijn onafhankelijk van de 
perspectieven van individuen of sociale groepen. D
aarnaast lijken m
ensen 
toe te laten dat tegenstrijdige m





ensen Independence en Exclusion niet consistent toepassen 
en onderscheid m
aken tussen verschillende m
orele uitspraken concludeer ik 
dat Uniform










enten niet consistent Independence en Exclusion m
e-
ten en ze w
aarschijnlijk vooral expliciete overtuigingen m
eten concludeer ik 
dat w
e dit niet als em
pirisch bew






eede hoofdstuk onderzoek ik of een m
eetinstrum

















oor gebruik te m
aken van 
verschillende vorm
en van factoranalyse op tw
intig ethische uitspraken laat 






 ik “Independent Truth” en dit gaat 
om
 het idee dat m
orele uitspraken w
aar of onw





 ik “Universal Truth” en dit gaat om







ivine Truth” en dit 
gaat om
 het idee dat de w
aarheid van m
orele uitspraken afhankelijk is van het 
bestaan van bevelen van een goddelijke entiteit. M
ijn onderzoek laat verder 
zien dat de scores van m





et een specifiek voorbeeld, bijvoorbeeld m
et betrek-
king tot vrouw




aar is. Tegelijk is het niet duidelijk of bestaand 
onderzoek im
pliciete of expliciete overtuigingen hebben gem
eten. Als het 
klopt dat bestaand onderzoek expliciete overtuigingen m
eet én dat FM
O
 van 
toepassing is op im
pliciete overtuigingen dan kunnen w
e op basis van be-








ege (1) het feit dat bestaande m
eetinstrum





eten, en (2) dat de m
eeste onderzoeken 
m





sing is op im
pliciete overtuigingen, kom
 ik tot de conclusie dat bestaande 
studies geen em
pirisch bew
ijs leveren voor of tegen FM
O.
 
In het eerste hoofdstuk heb ik onderzocht w
at FM
O
 precies inhoudt en of 
er em
pirische evidentie voor of tegen FM
O




 te beschrijven. H
et eerste criterium
 is “Independence”. Indepen-
dence om




onafhankelijk is van de m
entale toestanden van individuen of de collectieve 
overtuigingen van sociale groepen. Een m
orele uitspraak zoals “abortus is 
niet toelaatbaar” is dus niet w
aar of onw
aar om
dat bepaalde individuen, of 
bepaalde sociale groepen of culturen, geloven dat het w
aar of onw




orele uitspraken, zoals bijvoorbeeld “Spinazie is lekker” of 
“Je dient m
et m
es en vork te eten”, geldt dat de w
aarheid van deze uitspraken 
afhankelijk is van w




aar is dan zouden m
ensen m
oeten geloven dat Independence 






 dat ik gebruik is “Exclusion”. D
it criterium
 is ge-
baseerd op het idee dat tegenstrijdige m
orele uitspraken niet tegelijk w
aar 
kunnen zijn. W
anneer een individu gelooft dat liegen m
oreel toelaatbaar is 
en een ander individu dat liegen m
oreel ontoelaatbaar is dan kan m
axim
aal 
een van beide partijen gelijk hebben. Als FM
O
 w
aar is dan zouden m
ensen 
m








kennis, of het m
aken van vergissingen, m
ogelijk is voor dat dom
ein. In de 
concrete conditie beantw
oorden zij een soortgelijke vraag voor verschillende 
concrete voorbeelden. D
e resultaten tonen aan dat m
ensen geneigd zijn om
 
te denken dat w
etenschap zow
el abstract als concreet een objectieve kw
estie 
betreft. D
it geldt echter niet voor m
oraliteit. D
e resultaten van de m
etingen 





orele vergissingen, dat m
ensen dit niet als objectief be-
schouw
en. D
e resultaten van de m
etingen in de concrete conditie tonen ook 
aan dat w











esties over persoonlijke voorkeuren 
of sociale conventies. Gegeven dat deze resultaten m




 van toepassing is op im
pliciete overtui-
gingen kunnen w









e resultaten van m








itteerd zijn aan m
oreel objectivism
e lijken zij zich 
te vergissen. D
e resultaten in het derde hoofdstuk suggereren dat m
ensen ge-
neigd zijn in im






eer onderzoek naar im
pliciete overtuigingen nodig voordat w
e dit stel-
lig kunnen concluderen. In toekom
stig onderzoek zou onderzocht kunnen 
w
orden hoe im





orden dat beide overtuigingen m
eet. O
p 
basis daarvan kan onderzocht w
orden of m
ensen im
pliciet en/of expliciete 
gecom
m
itteerd zijn aan m
oreel objectivism




ok kan dan 
w
orden onderzocht of em
pirische bevindingen over tolerantie, en de bereid-
heid om
 anderen te straffen als zij een norm
 overschrijden, in relatie staat tot 
im
pliciete overtuigingen, tot expliciete overtuigingen, of beide.
op verschillende w




ijn onderzoek aan dat m
ensen die hoog scoren op Independent 
Truth m
inder, en m





en overtreedt te bestraffen. 
 





itteerd zijn aan m
oreel objectivism
e. D
at doe ik door drie gedachtenexperi-
m




enten zijn door de filosoof D
avid Enoch ontw
ikkeld. Enoch (2014) 
betoogt dat zijn gedachtenexperim
enten aantonen dat m








ij de uitgelezen kans om









ijn resultaten tonen aan dat een m
eerderheid bij ieder gedachtenexperi-
m
ent reageert op een w





itteerd zijn aan m
oreel objectivism
e. In die zin ondersteunen de re-
sultaten van dit specifieke onderzoek FM
O. H
et is echter ook zo dat w
anneer 
de individuele scores w
orden gecom
bineerd, het resultaat een m
eer genu-
anceerd beeld verschaft: 50%
 van de respondenten scoort op een w
ijze die 
suggereert dat ze im
pliciet gecom
m
itteerd zijn aan m
oreel objectivism
e. Een 
van de nuances die ik hierbij w
il aanbrengen is dat dit percentage m
ogelijk 
daalt indien er in het onderzoek aanvullende vragen w
orden gesteld van een 
gelijksoortige aard. H
et is ook m
ogelijk dat betere tests ervoor zorgen dat dit 
percentage stijgt.
 
In het laatste hoofdstuk presenteer ik een onderzoek naar de vraag of 
m
ensen geloven in de m
ogelijkheid van objectieve m
orele vooruitgang, objec-
tieve m
orele kennis, en het m
aken van m
orele vergissingen in objectieve zin. 
D
it onderzoek heb ik uitgevoerd sam
en m
et Thom
as Pölzler en Jacob D
ijkstra. 
In het survey experim
ent dat w
e hebben uitgevoerd w
orden participanten toe-
gew
ezen aan een abstracte conditie of een concrete conditie. In de abstracte 
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